Lessons Learned / Key Points

• The British could Break-In but not Break-Through the German defences, this would be the rule for both sides until March 191

• The British had suffered severe shortages in Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) and more critically artillery shells. The 10TH March had consumed upwards of 30% of available ammunition of the 1ST Army

• Resources that could have been used on the WF had been diverted to the Dardanelles

• The difficulty of communication between various levels on the Battlefield i.e. The advance of 20TH Brigade on the 12TH March 1915 even after the order had been cancelled was an example

• The element of surprise was achieved – something that would not be used (all-but in local operations i.e. Hooge August 1915) until 1917

• Artillery is unable to register shell fall due to adverse weather conditions (visibility below 50 yards on some days) this combined with the limitation of shells compounds matters.

• The Germans had proved that defence against overwhelming opposition could be achieved, the BEF had close to a 5:1 advantage at the start of the offensive and with Machine Guns and well trained artillery attacking forces could be worn down without the need for mass forces in the immediate defensive zone.

• Time is lost awaiting forward movement (include authorisation to advance from commanders at HQ) allow Germans to reinforce positions – information from the field commanders has difficultly flowing back up the chain of command. Time is also lost in the doctrine of waiting until all formations are inline before continuing an assault – however, the benefit of hindsight is a glorious thing 100 years on.

• The British prove their mettle and are capable of mounting and executing an assault, proving to their French partners their willingness to be active participants on the battlefield.

• Reserves are too far back to be effectively deployed when needed (although sufficient forces are available to press forward) – this would be a common theme across the 1915 battlefield and one of the key reasons of the removal of F.M. French as commander. F.M. French is under orders not to waste life unnecessarily and holding back reserves far away from firing lines could be attributed to this.

• Intelligence and observation failed to notice German reinforcements that flooded the area – this is not helped by the poor visibility but once the attack re-commences on the 11TH March, trenches and fortified locations are missed prior to the infantry assault beginning.

• One of the key points often overlooked was this is the first organised offensive attack by the British in the new war – many of the commanders from Division level and above are from the Boer War and have progressed through Sandhurst learning about open-warfare. This is a new type of warfare, one which the British Army (from BEF to platoon) will need time to adapt and learn from – this is the first attempt at making offensive warfare on a largely static battlefield.

• It should also be remembered that F.M. French is not only fighting the German war machine but also seemingly his own Generals along with a shortage in resources, particularly ammunition. The shell scandal would persist for another seven months; Kitchener at first refuses to believe that a shortage of shells could lead to stalled offensives; French & Haig are both quick to realise the importance of artillery in the future war, although the usage will take years to perfect.

• The Germans conscious of a near breakthrough that could have occurred are quick to begin strengthening the WF; concrete becoming a key construction material. Further advances in 1915 will be against much stronger fortifications with defence not limited to the forward lines.

• Another overlooked point of the Great War is the importance of logistics; the Germans are able to rapidly redeploy troops into Neuve Chapelle using their extensive rail network, able to move entire divisions along with ammunition trains, field kitchens etc. almost immediately to strength the line as required