Battles
The War
The Battle of Mons
22nd to 24th August 1914
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The Battle for Mons would be the Kaiser’s first opportunity to defeat the “contemptible little British Army”, as part of the Schlieffen plan, allowing for the promise of the German army being home in time for the leaves turning brown.
For the British, the battle was to be the first engagement against the Imperial German Field Army. Initially intended to be an offensive operation for the British, it would quickly develop into the opposite but would prove to be a defining action, that would gain almost mythical status as the tiny BEF forces delayed and subjected the massively overwhelming numbers of the advancing Germans to severe casualties, allowing valuable time for the beleaguered French forces to regroup and ultimately foil the Schlieffen Plan on the Marne in September 1914.
The Battle would be fought amongst the streets of Mons in Belgium and directly west towards St-Ghislain, following the road of the present day E19. The battle would begin on 23 August and would last until the evening of 24 August, a time at which both sides were feeling out the other, unknown of locations or strength of their opponents.
British casualties would be approx. 1,600 with Germans estimated at between 2,500 and in excess of 5,000; although the Germans would achieve a strategic gain in the capture of Mons, tactically they had failed to prevent the French reorganisation nor encircle or outflank the British and had been dealt a hard jab by an army it treated with great contempt.
Prelude
The BEF landed in France on 9 August with a force of approximately 80,000 “professional” soldiers – highly trained in musketry and drill these soldiers were capable of firing 15 times per minute and able to march 15 miles in full kit, in a test known as the Kitchener test.
Split into I Corp commanded by Douglas Haig (DH) and II Corp commanded by Horace Smith Dorrien (SD) with a division of cavalry under Edmund Allenby. Most of the regular soldiers were under command of I Corp; whilst II Corp saw many of its rank drawn from the reservists (men who had served their time, but were paid retainers to maintain commitment and could be called upon at times of war), with some battalions of the II Corp having up to 70% reservists in their ranks.
Facing these two Corps of the BEF were two armies of the Germans commanded by Alexander Von Kluck of First Army and Second Army under Karl Von Bulow. although both men were the same rank, the right wing sector in which these armies both fought was under the command of Von Bulow, who would favour a more cautious approach in his implementation of the Schlieffen plan. This would anger Von Kluck, who was more aggressive and pragmatic and willing to disregard the overall plan in favour of supporting on going developments on the battlefield – this would ultimately lead to the unravelling of the Schlieffen plan on the Marne.
The British had been dealt a blow prior to the battle when the intended commander of II Corp Lt. Gen James Grierson suffered a fatal heart-attack en-route to commanding II Corp at Amiens on 17 August. Grierson, a fluent French & German speaker and former military attaché to Germany, had acquired in the words of Sir John French (SJF) “an intimate knowledge of the German army” and was considered the leading British military expert on German planning, execution and weaponry – fate did not appear to be shining on the BEF!
SJF wished to appoint Major General Hubert Plumer, but much to SJF annoyance he was overruled by Field Marshall Kitchener and SD is appointed, a man who SJF neither liked nor admired largely dating back to pre-war disagreements. Although SD was certainly a capable General and a visionary in identifying the role of artillery in the Great War, he would never have the full backing of his commander. SD would only gain command of II Corps on 21 August 1914 in the afternoon – 2 days prior to battle!
The British would take up their portion of the line on the left (north) of the French Fifth Army commanded by Charles Lanrezac, another man detested by SJF although this was largely due to the Frenchman, with II Corps taking up the left flank, ultimately and unbeknownst to the BEF the German First Army and I Corps under Haig facing parts of Second Army under Von Bulow.
Battle of Charleroi
On 21 August, the French Fifth Army was engaged by the German Second and Third Armies during the Battle of Charleroi. The French had been planning to carry out their offensive doctrine as specified in the XVII plan but the Germans sprung first on the morning of 21 August.
Another assault on 22 August put more pressure on the French and by 23 August the Fifth Army had begun to fall back under the weight of German pressure. The British line joined the French along the River Sambre and a retreat by the French would leave the British right flank dangerously exposed.
Plan
The British deployed their forces with the Fifth Division (Maj. Gen Fergusson) on the left of Third Division (Maj. Gen Hamilton) along the Mons-Conde canal with I Corps to their right joining with the French Fifth Army and a French cavalry corps under General Sordet.
The town of Mons would be a salient forward around the edges of the town following the line of the canal. Many crossing points were available either for road, rail or foot traffic and the plan would be in the event of an attack which might lead to retreat, to blow these bridges slowing the advancing Germans.
SJF had initially conceived an offensive operation taking place with the use of cavalry to exploit opportunities, unbeknown of the size of force facing him, he became aware of a German offensive through Charleroi by his liaison officer Spears but did not expect this to alter his planning.
Mons to Conde canal (click to enlarge)
(British) Order of Battle
II Corps - Lt General Sir Horace Smith Dorrien (SD)
3rd Division – Major General Hubert "Hammy" Hamilton
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7th Brigade - Brigadier-General FWN McCracken
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3/Worcestershire Regiment (3/Worcs)
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2/South Lancashire Regiment (2/Lancs)
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1/Wiltshire Regiment (1/Wilts)
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2/The Royal Irish Rifles (2/RIR)
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8th Brigade - Brigadier-General BJC Doran
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2/Royal Scots Rifles (2/RSR)
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2/Royal Irish Rifles (2/RIR)
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4/Middlesex (4/Midds)
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1/Gordon Highlanders (1/GH)
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9th Brigade - Brigadier General FC Shaw
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1/Northumberland Fusiliers (1/NF)
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4/Royal Fusiliers (4/RF)
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1/The Lincolnshires (1/Lincs)
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1/Royal Scots Fusiliers (1/RSF)
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C Squadron Cavalry - 15th King's Hussars
5th Division – Major General Sir Charles Furgusson
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13th Infantry Brigade - Brigadier-General GJ Cuthbert
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2/King's Own Scottish Borderers (2/KOSB)
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2/Duke of Wellington's (2/DoW)
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1/Royal West Kents(1/RWK)
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2/King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (2/KOYLI)
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14th Infantry Brigade - Brigadier-General SP Rolt
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2/Suffolks (2/Suffolk)
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1/East Surrey (1/E.Surrey)
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1/Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (1/DCLI)
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2/Manchester (2/Mans)
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15th Infantry Brigade - Brigadier-General AEW Count Gleichen
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1/Norfolk
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1/Bedfordshire
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1/Cheshire
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1/Dorset
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A Squadron Cavalry - 19th Hussars
Prior to Battle
Prior to battle the rumours of atrocities carried out by the Germans began reaching the British – the torching of Louven had taken place on 22 August along with massacres at Seillies and Dinant.
After the defeat of the French Fifth Army, Lanrezac requests that the BEF hold the German First Army at bay to allow his troops the time they needed to regroup and retreat. This would be a mammoth commitment considering the scale of the task but SJF agreed to hold the line around Mons for 24 hours.
The British would arrive at Mons on the 22 August but scouting parties of advance elements had begun arriving on 21 August; included in this was John Parr of the 4/Middlesex who was a cyclist tasked with making contact and reconnaissance of the Germans in Obourg about 8 miles to the north east of Mons. Having made contact Parr was killed in a rifle fight with German cavalry (doing likewise against the British) after a companion had returned reporting the contact.
22 August 1914
The morning begins with SJF travelling to meet with Lanrezac but instead meets with Edward Spears who informs him of the recent German advance at Charleroi and that the French intended to withdraw. This information is relayed to Corps commanders, who are still preparing an advance but SD also begins construction of a second defence line behind the town of Mons.
The Fifth Division is placed on the BEF’s extreme left with 14/Brigade, to its right 13/Brigade with 15/Brigade in reserve, the line stretching from Mons for over 10km heading west behind the Conde Canal.
Third Division contacted Fifth Division to its right with 9/Brigade in contact with the 13/Brigade forming a salient around the outskirts of the town; joining 9/Brigade, to its right was the 8/Brigade with the 4/Middlesex beyond the canal with the remaining 3 battalions behind. The reserve 7/Brigade ready to be brought into the line once an advance begun.
Allenby’s Cavalry Division was tasked with making contact with the Germans beyond the Conde canal and in the morning, elements of 4/Irish Dragoons under Major Tom Bridges came into contact with scouting German cavalry and Cpl. Thomas dismounted and fired the first British shots of the war. 4/Irish Dragoons gave chase and claimed the first German fatality from the BEF around the Queen of Hungary before reinforcements arrived and the Dragoons broke the chase.
During the late afternoon, the advanced 4/Middlesex would exchange fire with a scouting party of German cavalry it made contact with on its right.
23 August 1914
Site of the first shot of WW1 (click to enlarge)
The morning dawned misty with light rain in the air and the sense within the town was the furthest thing from war; people prepared for holidays and trains still ran seemingly regardless of the situation about to unfold (a British officer would later be grateful for this, escaping capture via the rail network from the clutches of the German Army).
The Royal Engineers became aware that any German advance meant the destruction of the bridges surrounding Mons once advance elements were safely back on the British side. Early morning SJF meet with his commanders (DH, Allenby & SD) awaiting assessment of the French situation and reports from the RNAS of reconnaissance with CIGS Archibald Murray remaining at II Corps HQ awaiting developments.
For the Germans the plan was to attack with three Corps facing Mons having discovered the BEF the previous day and meet the British head-on rather than trying to encircle.
3rd Divison
With 9/Brigade on the left of 8/Brigade and the 4/Middlesex (8/Brigade) holding positions across the canal, this battalion would feel the weight of the first German offensive. The Lt. Colonel of the battalion Lt. Col. Hull declared “...This gentlemen, is where we stand and fight.”
9th Brigade (Left)
On the right of Third Division front was the 4/Royal Fusiliers with 6 bridges on their front. B Coy was located around the railway station and Lock 5 whilst D Coy was to be found at Lock 6. A Coy was in reserve and the RFA assisted with 4 x 18lbs situated around the railway station supporting B Coy. The battalion placed its two machine guns on railway bridges with commanding views to support the front line.
The battalion, situated in front of Nimy facing woodland, first encountered the enemy at 08:00 with a cavalry patrol unaware of the BEF position fired upon, whom flee from the initial contact.
10:00 – The enemy advance 4-abreast; this is easily beaten back with Germans making easy targets in block formation. Then follows an artillery bombardment on the 4/RF followed by another assault. With no assistance from the RFA casualties mount but the advance is halted by MG fire from the railway bridges.
11:00 – The RE is sent forward to destroy bridges on the battalion front but not enough charge is available to fire the bridge heads, and enemy fire stops further attempts to put these out of action.
13:00 – Further casualties suffered by the battalion from German fire from within the woodland and supporting artillery forces D Coy to move back beyond the canal. 40 minutes later the final men from the battalion are across the canal and the RE would again attempt to destroy crossing points – the battalion is to retire back towards Mons with the Germans unable to give chase.
14:00 – Bridges blown or taken out of action. However Musketier Oscar Niemeyer is able to swim the canal and operate a swing bridge back into position; he is killed in this action but the Germans now have a crossing point that would affect both 9/Brigade and also expose the left flank of 8/Brigade. This retreat was covered by the 1/Lincolns but the Germans harassed 4/RF throughout their retreat causing more than 150 casualties.
In the centre of the Brigade was 1/RSF who had been brought up overnight and were to be found in front of Jemappes placing outposts over the canal.
06:00 – First contact with the enemy with B Coy breaking up a scouting patrol of Uhlans.
10:30 – Artillery bombardment followed by block advance with troops advancing 4-abreast; these initial assaults are held. Further advances are more tactical astute with smaller assaults not making such easy targets; these force advance posts to be withdrawn.
B&C Coys shared the defensive line around the railway station with D Coy on the battalion’s left flank and A Coy in reserve at the village church.
Godley's Bridge, Mons (click to enlarge)
14:30 – Lt. Col Smith received orders for the withdrawal of his battalion and RE to blow the bridges in his sector. Lock No. 2 is destroyed by Cpl Jarvis after riding his bicycle under heavy German fire from the water meadows, Jarvis receiving a VC for his actions. All bridges in the sector are successfully destroyed however a power failure at a bridge at Pont Richebe would allow the Germans to cross and made the retirement of the battalion back toward Frameries incur increasing losses.
On the left of 9/Brigade was 1/Northumberland Fusiliers (NF) around Quaregnon with B & C Coys on the left flank of the division with A Coy prepared in defensive positions around a swing bridge, with loopholes made in housing in the village.
1/NF would hear the battle raging to the right but were not involved until 09:00 when a small infantry advance was rapidly halted.
11:00 – Advance parties across the canal are withdrawn under artillery fire and into the trenches prepared by B & C Coys.
14:30 – Withdrawal order for the Brigade is not received and the battalion unaware of withdrawal of 1/RSF to its right, 30 minutes later the enemy is observed massing over the canal preparing an assault. Around the same time sappers from the RE arrive to blow the swing bridge in front of A Coy but the detonation leads are too short.
16:00 – Withdrawal orders finally received by this point C Coy is heavily engaged and forced back into coal sheds by the advancing Germans. The battalion begins withdrawal towards Frameries. The battalion would suffer 100 casualties during the day.
8th Brigade (Right)
On the Brigade’s left was the 4/Middlesex with 3 bridges on their sector and one between them and the 4/Royal Fusiliers on the boundary between Third and Fifth Division.
08:00 – Shots are exchanged between D Coy and German patrols, 30 minutes later the Germans commence a heavy bombardment followed by an advance. The RE are sent forward to blow the bridges on the Middlesex front but are too late with Germans already advancing upon them.
10:00 – The Germans are now crossing the bridges in solid formation but suffer heavily from rifle and MG fire. By 10:30 are over bridges and advance further into Mons forcing the British back.
11:00 – The Germans are squeezing the British line back and the front is now to be found around the cemetery; by midday the 2/RIR are called up to support and begin arriving promptly with A Coy along with two platoons from B & C Coys sent to assist C Coy of the Middlesex in the Quarry.
13:30 – MG of the 2/RIR are put out of action and the 2/RIR now covers a sector from the Quarry to the Mental Hospital with half of B Coy alongside A Coy, then D Coy and the remaining half of B Coy and the remnants of 4/Middlesex on the right flank.
14:00 – The Germans begin to infiltrate the line; B Coy of 2/RIR they would begin to retire from the field and by 15:30 the last of the shattered Middlesex would be on the road to Hyon. However, the action was not over for the battalion as they find German units behind the line on the road to Hyon and suffer another 60 casualties during the retreat. By the end of the day rollcall would be 275 men remaining out of an original strength of 26 officers and 983 other ranks.
The 1/Gordon Highlanders would cover the right flank of the Brigade on the road from Mons to Hyon. The battalion had three batteries of field artillery scattered in the woods of Bois la Haut to the SE of Mons. The right flank would be comparatively quiet compared to the left flank in the morning.
By 13:30 the QMS would gather 40 men to cover the retirement of the 4/Middlesex from the battlefield as a protective screen to the battalion flank.
1/GH and 2/RIR at Mons (click to enlarge)
14:00 – The German assault would begin on the Gordons, waves of soldiers crossing the canal with the bridges unable to be blown. The Scotsmen would suffer heavily in the fighting with the enemy with A Coy losing all officers as Germans poured into their positions. Later C Coy would be deployed from reserve and would evict Germans from the lines by the point of the bayonet.
16:00 – With an exposed flank the 1/Gordons began withdrawing in conjunction with 2/RIR behind the safety of higher ground. The Gordons and batteries of the RFA cover this withdrawal allowing the 2/RIR time to regroup. By 17:00 further waves of the enemy begin to threaten RFA positions on the raised ground but they are steadily beaten back by the Gordons.
20:00 – another German assault captures four field guns from the summit of the raised ground but these are retaken by counter assaults from the 1/Gordons, this would be the final German action of the day on 8/Brigade and at 22:00 the Gordons would withdraw to Nouvelles arriving at 04:30.
5th Divison
Major General Fergusson would have the 13 & 14 Brigade seeing action during the initial assault with the 13 Brigade on the Division’s right flank.
14th Brigade (Left)
The extreme of Fifth Division’s flank was covered by the 1/Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (DCLI) battalion with the 1/E. Surrey in contact with 13 Brigade on its right. The Surreymen held the line immediately in front of Les Herbieries with 2 bridges in this sector including an iron rail bridge with the 1/DCLI holding Pont D’Hautrage to the brigade junction with the 13 Brigade around Lock 5; a sector of over 2,000 yards but with no bridges facing them. 2/Suffolks provided the support battalion for 1/E. Surreys with 2/Manchester in reserve of 1/DCLI.
1/E. Surreys found themselves with C Coy over the canal in outposts awaiting contact with the enemy; B Coy on the left flank and D Coy out on the south bank of the canal with A Coy as the battalion’s reserve company.
The battle appears to rage around both battalions in the early morning with Lt. Col Longley in charge of the Surreys hearing of the action from the neighbouring brigade to their right. It wasn’t until 13:00 that the enemy engaged the Surreys with small arms fire coming from over the canal. An hour later the Surreys dispatched the two MG teams to their neighbouring battalion to assist the 2/KOSB and at 16:00 50 men from the reserve company are brought up to support the 2/KOSB and in removing Germans that have infiltrated the British line.
18:00 – Although no serious action has taken place, Longley is aware of the fighting on 13/Brigade front and orders outposts from C Coy to retire from over the canal to the south side, wanting to ensure the Brigade flank is secure. The order reaches all but the one platoon who do not retire with comrades.
19:00 – The Germans aware of the retirement of C Coy advance towards the canal but do not cross it; the stranded section of C Coy is either captured or killed after a bayonet charge. The bridges in the brigade sector remain largely intact and the iron rail bridge is only partially destroyed. No crossing is attempted and the Surreys along with the reserve battalion of 2/Suffolks arrive in Dour before daybreak.
The 1/DCLI on the left flank faced a difficult challenge to the rest of the battalions in the Mons salient – they occupied land either side of a water meadow and this boggy terrain would make retreat difficult. Lt. Col Turner would be fully aware that a delayed retreat might spell disaster for the battalion. He would also be aware that his left flank was the extreme left of the entire BEF and any withdrawal by the French (the likes of which occurred at Charleroi) could possibly lead to enfilading.
The battalion was dispersed with C Coy across the canal; B Coy in the centre and A Coy in contact with the 1/E. Surreys on the Brigade’s right wing.
06:00 – The battalion would see early action when engaging a cavalry patrol seemingly unaware of their presence, as they cantered slowly towards them. C Coy broke up this patrol, capturing a prisoner in the engagement.
The rest of the morning would be largely uneventful – aware of fighting to their right, Turner would also be mindful of his left flank and withdrew his MGs to the south side of the canal also creating a manned blockade made from road stones.
15:30 – Much to the relief of Turner 19/Brigade arrived and were installed as a flank guard protecting Fifth Division flank. This support arrived just in time, as the newly inserted battalion of 1/Middlesex was attacked at 16:30 fending off the assault.
16:45 – Another enemy advance from Ville Pommeroeul was made by infantry 4-abreast supported by cavalry; this was again broken up by the 19/Brigade at great cost to the Germans. All remaining platoons over the canal were ordered to withdraw with the RE given the order to blow the bridge at Lock 5 on the Brigade border at 17:30. The MGs of the 2/Manchester would support the withdrawal of C Coy.
18:00 – 1/DCLI begin withdrawal 1,000 yards towards Sardon with 2/Manchester MG guns causing losses to the Germans whom attempted capitalize on this retreat.
23:00 – The battalion withdraws further towards Elogues – hot on their heels was the enemy having managed to secure crossing of the canal. The final action of the day for men of the Cornwalls and 2/Manchester was to fight off an advance under a shrapnel barrage but this was largely ineffective and the battalion completed its retirement with minimal casualties.
13th Brigade (Right)
The Brigade’s line was held by the 1/Royal West Kent (RWK) battalion on the right around St. Ghislain with 2/Kings Own Scottish Borders (KOSB) around Les Herbieries. The 2/Duke of Wellingtons (DW) were the Brigade reserve but this battalion’s MG had been ordered forward to support the men of the 1/RWK.
1/RWK on Brigade right flank had begun preparing defensive positions overnight on the 23/24 August expecting the possibility of action the next day; they had moved 4 x 18lbs of the RFA into positions south of the canal in support of these positions. The battalion would receive reports from Belgian civilians of German troops massing on the far canal bank. The battalion would send out recon patrols along with cavalry towards Tertre to try and make contact with the enemy.
08:15 – Battalion cyclists arrive at full speed from scouting patrols – artillery spot these movements and begin concentrating fire on the battalion lines – around 10 minutes later a heavy infantry advance began in solid formation (as if on parade) which was halted with heavy casualties for the battalion; further waves continued through till midday when A Coy is forced to retire due to losses, replaced by B Coy.
12:00 – The battalion’s MG are shelled and knocked out and the order was given only to fire when necessary to prevent observation of positions and stop enemy shelling.
15:00 – A mass body of the enemy was spotted and rifle fire cut down the men advancing across the open ground but as soon as one man fell, it appeared another took his place.
17:00 – Further advances continued getting within a few hundred yards of the 1/RWK but seemingly when all appeared to be lost, the Germans sounded the bugle for the cessation of fighting – seemingly blinking before the West Kents.
18:00 – Order received from Brigadier Cuthbert to retire; the order to blow the bridges having been given four hours previously but the RE unable to carry out instructions due to British units still in contact with the Germans on the other side. 30 minutes later a local attack began but was defeated.
19:30 – Battalion begins withdrawal; however they would leave behind a section who had been unable to receive the retirement order – these men would continue fighting until the morning when their plight became apparent, eventually withdrawing leaving behind their casualties.
On the Brigade’s left were the men of the 2/KOSB who had positioned B & C Coys in shallow trenches behind the canal at Les Herbieres with A & D Coys in contact with the 1/RWK. They would have the Iron Bridge at Lock 4 in their sector and like the 1/RWK the reserve battalion (2/KOYLI) would provide their two MG to the Scotsmen. The Yorkshiremen would be found at Boussu.
08:30 – Hearing the battle to their right but not directly involved, the battalion is unaware of the situation with the 1/RWK; the Germans of Von Kluck’s army are not in position to launch an offensive.
13:00 – German infantry spotted moving up from Tertre but the battalion’s rifles are hot and cause casualties. 10 minutes later the German artillery comes into action causing damage to C Coy, who are reinforced by A Coy. Additional reinforcements come around 14:30 with a company from the reserve (2/KOYLI) being deployed.
15:00 – Outposts moved behind the canal and RE given orders to destroy the Iron Bridge at Lock 4 but charge fails to explode. The scale of losses suffered by the Germans during the day had seen them decide not to advance over the bridge however by 19:00 the bridge is in German possession but the advance goes no further than securing the bridgehead.
Overnight the battalion slips away relatively peacefully compared with some withdrawals with men from 2/KOYLI covering the retreat to Dour.
End of Day - 23 August
The BEF had come through its first action relatively unscathed. II Corps had taken the full force of the fighting and had held up well considering the weight of German forces and the potential for its destruction. I Corps on the right was largely untouched on the first day – although this did concern Douglas Haig whom feared lack of head-on engagement meant the Germans might be attempting to turn the Corps’ flank.
Both sides were now well aware of the presence of each other, although the Fog Of War that prevailed was such that the Germans considered they were facing a much larger force armed with many MGs (Von Kluck believing he faced as many as 6 divisions) and the British under the impression the Germans had suffered devastating losses.
SD requested assistance from I Corps to plug a gap between Third & Fifth Divisions to which Haig dispatched Haking’s 5/Brigade. However he now had his flank protected with the afternoon arrival of 19/Brigade on the left.
It must have been dreadfully confusing for SJF & GHQ to make any definite conclusion on what was occurring on the ground – it should also be remembered that he was concerned about encirclement from his exposed flanks. His dislike for Lanrezac is well documented, having agreed to hold the line for 24 hours against an enemy of far greater size was a gamble that possibly might have risked the entire BEF. The Fog Of War was just as great for SJF as von Kluck or von Bulow; at least these two spoke the same language as each other as opposed to the armies on either side of French’s.
Both SD & DH reported back to GHQ satisfaction in their current overnight positions – although staff work between Corps & GHQ might be questioned in the later retreat it appeared after the first day that the improvement made after the army manoeuvres of 1913 had at least improved staff communication between the Corps.
01:00 – SJF issues orders for the retreat from Mons avoiding Maubeuge as a resting point despite its advantages of supplies, having heard reports of the German sieges of French & Belgian fortress towns during the opening weeks.
02:00 – I Corps HQ receives the retirement order and begins preparation.
04:00 – II Corps HQ gets the withdrawal orders 2 hours after I Corps and is at an immediate disadvantage.
GHQ learns that the French Fifth Army has withdrawn further to the south-west leaving the BEF right flank exposed – surely giving great alarm to DH seemingly reaffirming his fear of encirclement.
Von Kluck is also aware of the importance of Mauberge and detaches II Cavalry Corps in the hope of the encircling the British taking shelter in Mauberge.
Cavalry Divison on retreat from Mons (click to enlarge)
24 August 1914
GHQ concern now focused on the retreat and the Mormal Forest to the SW of Mauberge, to pass through this it would require the splitting of Haig & Smith-Dorrien’s Corps for 20 miles or so.
The army manoeuvres of 1913 had highlighted issues with Corps communication and liaison with GHQ and concern arose around this, but also about could they be mutually supporting in the event of an attack. More worrying to GHQ would be the possibility of flank attack or possible encirclement if German cavalry had been able to exploit the withdrawal of the French Fifth Army.
Of concern to SD was the delayed receipt of the retirement orders from GHQ. I Corps had been able to slip largely away before daybreak gaining a march on the Germans. II Corps would not be so lucky having spent much of the night improving positions in anticipation of standing its ground and of further assault.
It would now also face the possibility of conducting a retreat in daylight which would quickly become apparent to German artillery observers and this would be carried out on roads that would become clogged with fleeing civilians and French forces. Road discipline would also be a concern along with scouting and recon patrols having to make judgements on the spot and lead forces away from any potential enemy sightings.
Infact a few minor scuffles broke out with advanced German cavalry scouts along the bridges crossing the Sambre later in the day.
SD decided he would retire Third Division first followed by Fifth Division, however again through 24 August II Corps would be the only elements of the BEF to engage the enemy – no real action was seen by Haig’s Corps. To add slightly to SD concerns Haking’s 5/Brigade would withdraw under its own timetable unbeknown to him or GOC Third Division Hamilton leaving the flank of Third Division in the air at the beginning of II Corps’ retreat.
3rd Divison
7/Brigade (Divisional left flank) was found around Ciply and had largely avoided contact with the enemy on the opening day but around dawn the German artillery opened up. The brigade sheltered from this bombardment but had not received the withdrawal order and probably expected an infantry assault was imminent.
8/Brigade to its right received withdrawal orders and was able to retire albeit before the German bombardment had begun in earnest, they slipped away with minimal losses.
9/Brigade behind these at Frameries suffered from shelling around 05:00 with the 1/NF & 2/Worcs taking the brunt of this in the centre of the village. At 07:30 they would hold off a German assault that caused some casualties forcing them to withdraw to higher ground further south in the village.
08:30 – 7 Brigade are engaged by the enemy around the road into Cuesmes – 2/Lancs & 3/Worcs halted advancing Germans but withdrew in the face of a superior foe. 15 minutes later the Germans began crossing the Conde canal from both sides in almost a pincer movement with the intention seemingly to force 7 & 9 Brigades towards Mauberge. Major General Hamilton orders the withdrawal from Frameries.
5th Divison
The morning started badly with the delay receiving the withdrawal order and with many units deprived of sleep and food preparing defences for the anticipated onslaught. It would get worse for GOC Fergusson when the Cavalry corps & 19/Brigade were found to have already withdrawn, giving an exposed left flank which he needed to plug immediately. It would also mean that Fifth Division would need to flank march on this exposed wing and a task force was formed from the previously withdrawn units later that morning.
The Division had the 14/Brigade in front of Audregnies running east towards Dour then the 13/Brigade (Divisional right) stretching onto Wasmes and both these two Brigades would be involved in battles in and around these villages.
Closest to the Third Division joining with the soon to be retired Brigade of Haking’s, was the 13/Brigade many battalions having been involved in the fighting on the previous day and many being depleted. 2/KOSB arriving at 01:30 began defensive preparations in Petit Wasmes. At 03:00 2/DoW arrive and begin work on a second line; around the same time the 1/RWK arrive – the latter two battalions suffering shelling at dawn from German batteries. Finally arriving at 07:00!! Was the 2/KOYLI these were put into the line to the left of the village with no rest given.
2 Coys of the 2/Dorsets from 14/Brigade arrive to cover the retreat but these would be involved in the Battle for Wasmes – shelling is sporadic throughout the morning until 11:00.
12:00 – The Germans launch a heavy assault towards Wasmes from the 13/Brigade’s left against the 2/DoW – heavy casualties result to both sides and hand-to-hand fighting continues through the afternoon.
17:00 – German shelling of Audregines halted after the village is largely in their hands. Vicious street fighting would continue but with inevitable results – many Cheshires becoming prisoners with the German captors demanding to know the location of the many MGs – not believing that rifle fire could be responsible for the volume of small arms fire. The 1/Cheshire battalion would lose 800 men and 20 officers in the defence of Audregines.
By day’s end on 24 August 1914 the British would endure 1,600 casualties with a figure ranging from 2,200 to 5,000 estimated for the Germans (German figures did not tend to include minor injuries that did not require leaving the Corps area). Six VCs would be won in the course of these two days but most importantly the BEF had come through its open skirmishes from the Imperial Army demonstrating it was more than a “contemptible little army”.
13:00 – Advance behind artillery sees the enemy get close to the Cheshire’s line forcing 9/Lancers & 4/Dragoons Guards of II Cavalry Brigade to launch a charge which results in heavy loss of men and horses but is successful in scattering the attacks. Dismounted cavalry are now entwined with the Cheshires and Germans are evicted from the Chesters’ forward defences.
Major Tom Bridges is knocked out during this charge, only to be rescued by Belgian civilians and taken into a house, seeing advancing German infantry he finds a wounded horse, rides it back towards Audregines thus avoiding capture.
Luck was certainly not with the Cheshires on that day – as the Norfolks and Beds withdrew from either side of them – the message of this retirement fails to reach them and now with both flanks exposed, no cavalry protection and facing increasing losses the situation appeared doomed.
By 16:00 the situation for the Cheshires and their Lt. Col Boger was hopeless and he ordered an abandonment of the village but again only C Coy receive this order and part of them meet up with the Norfolks as they retire; the rest of Boger’s men are left to their fate.
Pte Godley and Lt Dease
(click to enlarge)
"The machine gun crews were constantly being knocked out. So cramped was their position that when a man was hit he had to be removed before another could take his place. The approach from the trench was across the open, and whenever a gun stopped Lieutenant Maurice Dease... went up to see what was wrong. To do this once called for no ordinary courage. To repeat it several times could only be done with real heroism. Dease was badly wounded on these journeys, but insisted on remaining at duty as long as one of his crew could fire. The third wound proved fatal, and a well deserved VC was awarded him posthumously. By this time both guns had ceased firing, and all the crew had been knocked out. In response to an inquiry whether anyone else knew how to operate the guns Private Godley came forward. He cleared the emplacement under heavy fire and brought the gun into action. But he had not been firing long before the gun was hit and put completely out of action. The water jackets of both guns were riddled with bullets, so that they were no longer of any use. Godley himself was badly wounded and later fell into the hands of the Germans."
HC O'Neill's account in 'The Royal Fusiliers in the Great War' of Lt Maurice Dease and Pte Sidney Godley winning their Victoria Crosses on 23 August 1914 at Mons
Lieutenant Maurice James Dease and Private Sidney Frank Godley win the VC at Mons
Aftermath
The German army had been dealt a blow at Mons, initial contact with the BEF was in theory meant to be decisive and the numerical advantage to German First & Second Armies meant that the outcome should have been little more than a small detail in history.
The major factor in this missed opportunity for the Germans was their inability to execute effective reconnaissance – relying mainly on scouting patrols of cavalry in contact with cyclists from Jager battalions to relay information to Army HQ; aerial reconnaissance was still in its infancy but Von Kluck was under the great impression he was facing an advance guard and the remainder of the BEF was to be found between Mauberge and Valenciennes – the Fog Of War under which both sides would operate certainly contributed to missed opportunities however.
Both Von Kluck & Von Bulow would operate during the early days of contact under false impressions with poor intelligence, often outdated as to the position, strength and intentions of the enemy, for example it was considered during the 25 & 26 of August that the British still intended to head for Mauberge; however staff of both the German armies failed to recognise that the BEF was in full retreat and had no intention of fighting on the field at this time.
Communication was equally as complex for the British as shown with the limited assistance of I Corps during the opening day of the battle and the delay in receiving the withdrawal order for II Corps.
On a heavy route march covering as much as 25 miles in a single day in baking hot August weather; ditching material as it went, it should be remembered that II Corps battalion were upto 70% territorial forces, not in the greatest shape and marching with freshly issued boots (not broken in) men would fall under these testing conditions.
German II Cavalry Corps would engage the flanking brigades through the retreat and also French cavalry at Landrecies – these minor skirmishes would bog down the Germans reducing their ability to outflank the British and lead to fighting small scale skirmishes for little strategic objectives in often unfavourable conditions for the attackers.
Had the intelligence been correct Von Kluck might have ordered his entire cavalry force to sweep wider, avoid contact with the enemy and turn its flank enabling an encirclement or at least slow the withdrawal to allow the numerically superior German infantry to catch up with the retreating British and bring about a decisive blow. However, this didn’t happen and despite the Forest of Mormal forcing the two corps further apart, they would both live to fight another day as an effective fighting force.
It should be commented here that I Corps had seen little of the battle at Mons and Haig, despite overtures of assistance towards II Corps was more concerned (rightly or wrongly) about the preservation of I Corp as an entity rather than assisting Smith-Dorrien in any meaningful way. Haig might have been concerned about the intentions of Von Kluck’s cavalry, the lack of meaningful contact with the Germans at Mons or the orders given (or not) by the CIC in combining both forces but Haig largely left II Corps to its own fate.
Analysis
Cases can be made for both a victory and a defeat for the BEF during the battle for Mons and both can be argued without a clear winner. From a purely military perspective the BEF was forced to retreat, gave up ground to a far superior foe.
However this should be placed in the context of the BEF being heavily outnumbered against two armies that had so far been largely unopposed in their advance through southern Belgium. They had held on for 48 hours allowing the French Fifth Army the time to refit and avoid the possibility of it being engaged in a potentially compelling battle. SJF had been good to his word to Lanrezac maintaining the line for the 24 hours requested, however the French still fell back towards St. Quentin.
It should also be remembered that this was the first British engagement on the continent since the Crimean War and the British Army was largely a policing force for local troubles and rebellions within the Empire, it had acquitted itself well against a vastly superior force. It had proved British mettle in combat and provided the OHL a realisation that the British could more than bloody the nose of the Imperial Army.
SJF has been criticised in some circles for his handling of the battle, his failure to give orders during the battle and seemingly handing over much of the command to his two Lt. Generals – however this is perhaps unfair considering the Fog Of War that existed at the time, the need to liaise with the French and understand not only their position but their intentions (this was not helped by the language barrier or Henry Wilson’s mis-interpretation of the numbers facing the BEF).
It should be remembered that the BEF avoided the potential trap at Mauberge (SJF considering this akin to the siege at Metz in the 1870 war) and that the Battle at Mons was largely a soldier’s battle, it is difficult to see how direction could be provided from top down considering the fluid nature of the battle – leadership largely came from Battalion level command until the retirement order was issue by French which was, all though slightly delayed in reaching II Corps, influenced by factors dictated by his allies on the flanks. It should also be remembered that communication between staff from both Corps and GHQ was certainly lacking and subject to much internal politics, also adding to the confusion at GHQ and to SJF.
For the Germans the two day offensive was a massive missed opportunity to strike a decisive blow to the British and ultimately would result in the unravelment of the Schlieffen Plan and defeat at the Marne in September.
Key to this was the lack of intelligence about the British formations facing Von Kluck’s army and the impression they were dealing with an advance guard rather than the entire BEF. Like SJF, Von Kluck was largely devoid of a direct role in the battle, highlighting the difficultly in communication experienced particularly at war’s beginning between battalion command upwards (no blueprint for this war was available, so learning in the field was of particular importance).
In German army structuring, although the same rank, Von Kluck was subordinate to Von Bulow and the two men didn’t get along. Von Bulow was characteristically inclined to be more cautious and criticism from First Army staff that Von Bulow’s insistence on holding its right flank strong rather than attacking through the West of Mons and I Corps had cost them a chance of scoring a decisive victory.
It could also be argued that with clearer instruction at operational level, when deploying II Cavalry Corps (possibly sending I Cavalry Corps as well) and avoiding becoming bogged down in local skirmishes along the way might have yielded greater casualties to the BEF (possibly destruction of II Corps) however the potential for envelopment or flank assault was never realised.
Returning to the British – SD, even though just installed in the role of CIC II Corps, had acquitted himself very well at Mons; he had taken a force inferior to I Corps (more territorials men) and conducted a successful retreat from the battlefield against the odds.
His opposite number from I Corps, Douglas Haig, had rather more question marks against him;
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Could he have done more to assist II Corps?
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Could his staff have liaised better and obtained a better understanding of II Corps’ situation?
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To what extent was he concerned about the lack of German frontal contact and the exposing of his right flank?
Haig was no fool rather a dour Scotsman, ever optimistic, but was more a solid pair of hands than a military genius (as Repington had commented during the 1913 army manoeuvers). It has been felt that Haig had left II Corps to its fate and this could be argued however it was probably his primary concern that the opening days of the conflict should not spell the end for the BEF; he perhaps understood that the British would certainly not win the war in the opening exchanges but could certainly lose it!
Mons Communal Cemetery (click to enlarge)
St Symphorien Military Cemetery (click to enlarge)