WW1 Remembrance | The War | Battle of Fromelles

The battle would begin on the 19TH July 1916 and last until the 20TH July. British Empire losses would exceed 7,000 with 1,500 for Germans defending and result in no ground gained for the Empire attacking forces.

The Battle was the first assault deployment (except trench raiding) of Australians on the Western Front and was designed as a diversionary attack for the major Anglo-French attack on Somme begun on 1ST July 1916.

Prelude

The British high command (GHQ), expecting a successful outcome to actions some 50 miles south on the Somme planned to exploit any breakthroughs with a widening of the action to include a further front. Commander in Chief Douglas Haig asked both First & Second Army to draw up offensive plans on the 5TH July 1916.

General Plumer commanding 2ND Army suggested a portion of the line between both his and 1ST Army in between army boundaries close to a strongpoint called the Sugarloaf around the village of Aubers.

General Munro commanding 1ST Army requested XI Corp commander Lt. General Richard Haking to make preparations for an offensive assault in this sector. Haking came back with a plan for a 4,600 yard front with three infantry divisions that would capture Fromelles, Aubers and the Ridge bearing the same name. Munro turned down this plan preferring a thrust from south of the La Basee Canal around Loos.

On 13TH July 1916, GHQ received intelligence that the Germans had moved eight battalions from their Lille Army to the Somme and as a result Haking’s plan is quickly resurrected. Munro, still sceptical wishes for the stunt to be purely artillery, but after a visit from Maj Gen. Butler (chief of staff for Haig) prefers the additional input of infantry.

Munro informs Haking that objectives should be strictly limited and plans to use two divisions from 1ST Army and an additional commitment

from 2ND Army and widens the front to 6,000 yards.

Plumer plans to assign the Australian 5TH Division along with artillery from the 4TH & 5TH Division to be under 1ST Army command, all inexperienced units with little or no combat experience. Plumer also reduces shell ammunition by nearly a third, in response Haking drops the front to 4,000 and reduces the infantry by one division.

Haking informs his divisional commanders of the planned offensive, specifying three brigades to attack with two assault battalions each covering 350 yards with 4 attacking waves approximately 100 yards apart.

FromellesPrelude

Plan

Haking plans the assault to begin on the 17TH July 1916 to begin with a seven hour artillery bombardment, with Divisional commanders given three days to plan their assault. Brigade commanders were empowered to decide how first waves would be deployed, but each one would be required to dig two communication trenches between the old and new front lines.

Over 200 guns were assembled but many artillery batteries had little experience, some never having fired a gun other than on the training ground. The artillery was to cut the wire, destroy machine guns and knock out the parapets prior to the attack.

The two assault divisions would be both taking part in their first offensive of the war, apart from trench raiding, and some battalions would have only taken to the firing trench for the first time prior to the off-day. They were also expected to perform fatigues and carrying parties for themselves, but these were partially completed by the 17TH.

By the 16TH July 1916 GHQ removed the urgency for action on other fronts as the German reserve movement to the Somme had stopped and any offensive could be postponed or cancelled. By midnight on the same day rain had begun pouring in French Flanders and artillery registration was difficult with the bombardment to being at 04:00. Haig authorises the assault can be cancelled if weather conditions werent conducive to a successful attack, Haking was reluctant to postpone or cancel and Munro backs his junior commander agreeing to a postponement until 08:00.

Ultimately the conditions do not improve and Haking cancels the show for 2 days until the 19TH July 1916 with the artillery to begin bombardment at 11:00 and the infantry to advance at 18:00.

FromellesPlan

Aubers 1915

The attack would focus on the identical ground of an attack on the 9TH May 1915 in which two divisions would assault in a pincer movement in a one-day assault lasting just over 12 hours without capturing any enemy ground.

The same major players in that offensive would be involved in the assault at Fromelles. Haking, then a Major General commanding 1ST Division would attack on the southern pincer; commanded by 1ST Corps commander Charles Munro part of 1ST Army (Douglas Haig)

Haig would cancel the battle after achieving neither tactical nor material gain losing over 11,000 causalities after a single day. The Germans for their part suffered 1,500 causalities and achieved the first outright defensive victory against the British, after partial British success at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 in which the German line was partially broken but without overall breakthrough.

Aubers15

Intervening Year

The Germans were certainly not idle in the intervening year, concerned at what they saw as a very near breakthrough at Neuve Chappelle, they began the progress of improving defence along the Western Front (WF) in order to free up resources to focus on the Eastern Front. Crucial to defensive mantra was the use of concrete and the adoption of lightly held, heavily mechanised front line defences with increasing manpower in supporting areas.

The Germans set about building concrete pillboxes with machine guns behind the front line to support frontline emplacements along with Wohngraden, a shelter 20 – 30 men connected to covered communication trenches. The engineers and pioneers also constructed observation points (OP) to provide extensive visibility of British positions, rear-areas and trench mortar pits to harass forward British lines.

These defensive improvements meant Brigades could reform their frontline commitments with only a single battalion being required to man the frontline, a second battalion to provide support to the fire line in the blockhouses, strongpoints and farmhouses a few hundred yards back and the third in reserve to be deployed once the initial attacking thrust has run out of impetus for counter-attacking and reclaiming of ground.

They also operated where lower level commanders on the ground would supersede higher ranking officers coming into the line providing a more details understanding of local conditions and deployments.

FromellesIntervening

Divisions

5TH Australian Division

Commanded by Major General McCay who took over command in March 1916 in Egypt and immediately ordered a desert march in full kit in 100 degree temperatures. Only a handful of men completed the march, which immediately strained relations between the commander and his men.

The division was considered to be a nursery division and was considered too inexperienced to be deployed to the Somme, having no prior experience of combat prior to landing in France and their first experience of manning the lines would be at Fromelles. The division was made up of:

8TH Brigade (Brigadier Gen. Tivey) – “All states” battalions – 29,30,31,32 Battalions
14TH Brigade (Brigadier Gen. Pope) – NSW Battalions – 53,54,55,56 Battalions
15TH Brigade (Brigadier Gen. Elliott) – Victoria Battalions – 57,58,59,60 Battalions
Artillery – (Brigadier Gen. Christian)

61ST Division (South Midlands)

Commanded by Major General MacKenzie formed in Jan 1915 and spent the first year on home guard, lacking equipment and training and the “best” men were drafted to other battalions in late 1915. The Division made landfall in France in May 1915. The men largely inexperienced had relieved the 38TH Welch Division which was moved to the Somme. The battalion had seen little front line experience but had conducted trench raids in the area prior to July 1916 and had suffered causalities which reduced the Battalion’s strength.

The division consisted of:

182ND Brigade (Brigadier Gen. Gordon) – Warwickshires – 2/5, 2/6, 2/7 & 2/8 Warwicks Battalions
183RD Brigade (Brigadier Gen. Stewart) – Gloucs & Worcs – 2/4 & 2/6 Gloucs and 2/6 & 2/7 Worcs
184TH Brigade (Brigadier Gen. Carter) – 2/1 Bucks, 2/4 Ox. & Bucks, 2/4 Berks & 2/5 Gloucs

FromellesDivisions

Prior to Battle

The Divisional lines would be split on the Sugarloaf which was the maximum extent of No Man’s Land (NML) over 400 yards of flatland with little cover on offer. The Australians would attack on the Left with the 61ST Division on the right; the Australian generally had a shorter crossing of NML and would have more men available for the assault than the British men who also had a wider attack front.

The Australians lined up with the 8TH Brigade on the left with mines to be blown prior to the first wave in NML with the 31ST & 32ND Battalion to be the two assault battalions.

In the centre attacking across 250 yards would be the 14TH Brigade with the 54TH battalion on the left and 53RD on the right.

On the right, joining up with 61ST Division was the 15TH Brigade formed up of the 60TH battalion on the left and the 59TH on the right; they would assault the left flank of the Sugarloaf at a distance of approximately 400 yards.

Haking advised McCay that support points were to be established once the first line was taken but McCay decided not to pass this down to his brigade commanders and orders first wave units to continue after this line was cleared. McCay moved his assault battalions into the line three hours prior to zero hour, many being spotted moving up by German OP and shelling began almost immediately. The front line was also affected by shells falling short from Australian Imperial Force (AIF) artillery from the rear.

The 61ST Division were ordered by Haking to create sally ports prior to the off, which would allow assault waves to exit through the breastwork prior to the artillery lifting, however these were spotted by OP in the German lines and shelling and machine gun (M.G.) fire would focus on when troops began to form up in NML. German artillery also scored direct hits on ammunition dumps destroying vital supplies prior to the off.

Night parties from the Australians reported the wire as largely uncut prior to the off except in front of the 8TH Brigade on the left flank. On the 61ST Division front, the nightly report sent back that the German fireline was weakly held but the Sugarloaf was largely untouched by the bombardment.

FromellesPriortoBattle

Fromelles19th

19TH July 1916

11:00 – The artillery would begin a seven hour bombardment of the German positions designed to cut the wire, destroy strongpoints and suppress fire from breastwork. Artillery would fall short throughout the day on the British and Australian lines, many Aussies not accustomed to the WF would no doubt have been amazed by the display and much “geed-up” before the off.

14:00 onwards – McCay wishing his attack wave to be in position three hours prior to the off meant the Australians began moving forward from 14:00 onwards. Spotted by German OPs in and around Aubers these were shelled with causalities resulting. In some sectors entire waves would be affected, but these were merely replaced with men from subsequent waves.

5TH Australian Division

8TH Brigade – Far Left Flank

17:50 – Men from 32ND Battalion begin to leave the trenches on the left followed a few minutes later by 31ST Battalion – enfilade fire begins from the exposed left flank affecting 32ND Battalion prior to the bombardment lifting. With the gas meant to conceal the attack not working.

18:00 – Mine explodes in front of 32ND Battalion – Germans aware of offensive begin to retreat from fire line. Both battalions get into German front line trenches with their first waves.

18:10 – 3RD and 4TH waves advance over captured front line, both battalions now begin to search for supposed German trenches behind the front line but unable to find them, become victims of M.G. fire from strongpoints in the support line. Relief is found in shell holes and ditches but advance is halted on Brigade front.

18:30 – Brigade H/Q becomes aware of successful capture of front line but requests for reinforcements cannot be authorized and instruct to “hold at all costs”

18:35 – 31ST Battalion withdraw any remaining pockets of men to the captured German first line and begin barricading the Kastenweg communication trench – Germans have already begun reinforcing Farms in the support lines opposite the Brigade

14TH Brigade – Centre of Australian assault

17:30 onwards – 53RD Battalion on the left suffer from enfilade and shelling before the off reducing battalion strength. 54TH Battalion more fortunate and wire in front of them largely cut and not many causalities forming up.

18:00 – 54TH Battalion gets into the German line with little loss (in general terms for the action) and begins to proceed to clear support bunkers. 53RD Battalion also get into the first line but with more causalities and with many officers victims, they become scattered and leaderless.

18:10 onwards – 3RD and 4TH waves continue the advance but again find no other lines in front of German support line and outposts are formed but causalities mount.

Fromelles, WW1 Remembrance, Conisbrough and Denaby 100 Project

Click for larger images

18:30 – Local German counter attacks begin against the weakened 53RD Battalion trying to expose a flank between the Brigades two battalions. 54TH Battalion report initial success back to Brigade H/Q who order supply runs to begin with M.G. to stabilise the line.

19:00 – Outposts in supposed second line begin to fall back on 54TH Battalion front due to short falling shells from Australian artillery.

19:30 – Reinforcement request sent to Brigadier General Pope who assigns 2 coys. of 55TH Battalion to be available by 21:30

23:00 – Localised German counter-attacks are repulsed by 53RD Battalion

15 Brigade – Right of Australian line, joining with 61ST Division

17:00 onwards – causalities from combined sides shelling mean men 3RD and 4TH waves are combined with initial assault wave on 31ST Battalion front

17:45 – First wave leaves trenches and enters NML – spotted by German OP, the 2ND wave is not so lucky and is the victim of fire from the Germans.

18:00 – Barrage lifts and waves immediately become visible to artillery, and small arms fire with most waves being cut down in NML. The

59TH Battalion on the far right flank has to cross the largest NML expanse in full view of the Sugarloaf. Leading waves of 59TH Battalion are cut down almost immediately the bombardment ceases. 60TH Battalion suffer a similar fate, but are able to get as far as the German parapet. Follow up waves are cut down cross NML and this Brigade assault is a complete failure. They also have an extended frontage and have to navigate right once in NML to reach objectives, difficult in the confusion of battle with shelling reducing visibility.

18:30 – Brigadier General Elliott reports to Divisional H/Q the success of the attack on the left – presumably the men seen on the parapet, in reality the 15 Brigade as a fighting force is no more.

19:00 – Clearer picture of 15TH Brigade front emerges and McCay informed that Germans still hold their front line.

61ST Division

184 Brigade – Left of Division, divisional boundary with Australian 5TH – to capture the Sugarloaf

14:30 – Brigade artillery to focus on suppression of Sugarloaf, in reality this has little impact

16:30 – Men move into forward line trenches but are subjected to artillery fire from German positions resulting in causalities to leading waves – these are supplemented by the subsequent waves.

17:30 – Men begin to leave through sally ports in the breastwork, on 2/4 Berks front this is in open view of the Sugarloaf with very heavy causalities. 2/1 Berks are slightly more fortunate that they are not directly observed but the sally ports quickly choked with wounded and remaining men have to use sap dug into NML.

18:00 – 2/1 Bucks have arguably the most difficult task of the whole battle to attack the Sugarloaf (largely unaffected by the barrage) at the widest crossing of NML at over 400 yards. A handful of men reach the parapet but are immediately cut down. Brigadier General Carter then releases reserve companies to support but these do not cross NML. 2/4 Berks find the wire largely uncut and begin falling back leaderless and unsupported.

18:15 onwards – situation at Brigade H/Q confused with reports of men entering the Sugarloaf and report send back to MacKenzie at Divisional H/Q. The situation on the ground was the opposite and Brigade has no positions in German line having suffered heavy casualities.

183RD Brigade – Centre of Division – occupy Wick Salient

17:30 onwards – 2/4 Gloucs (L) and 2/6 Gloucs (R) begin to exit sally ports which become clogged with the wounded as they are targets for German M.G. & rifle fire. Men resort to scaling parapet. After first wave other sally ports are used for additional waves and where not available men climb their own breastwork.

17:45 – German artillery concentrate on front trenches and NML causing causalities for assault battalions.

18:00 – Remaining men advance across NML but are cut down either by M.G. or shelling. Small parties from the 2/6 Gloucs enter the German lines but these are quickly overcome. Battalion command orders no further advance to be undertaken, describing the situation [to commit more men] as “useless”.

182ND Brigade – Far Right flank

17:30 onwards – 2/6 (L) & 2/7 Warwicks begin to exit sally ports but M.G. fire is concentrated on these causing some causalities.

18:00 – assault battalions advance, 2/6 front have active M.G. fire which enfilades assault troops. Wire largely intact and only a handful of men enter German lines.

2/7 more fortunate, the wire is largely broken and the bombardment more successful; assault waves are able to enter German lines in strength but suffer once advance continues onto the 2ND line. Battalion are short of M.G to suppress German strongpoints in support line and reinforcements requested to hold initial gains.

19:00 – Germans begin counter-attacking against 2/7 Warwicks with bombing parties forcing withdrawal back. By 19:45 the 2/7 Warwicks are largely back in their starting positions with isolated pockets in the German lines soon mopped up.

Evening of the 19TH July

By early evening on the 21ST the 61ST Division attack was back in its starting trenches having suffered a number of causalities on already depleted battalions but confused accounts at Divisional H/Q gave a different picture.

The Australians having more success had taken German front line positions but had been stopped when trying to advance to the mythical trenches just beyond the firing line. Almost all advances had been limited to the German first line by successful counter-attacks and short falling shells added to the problems. Again a confused picture had emerged, but rather telling of all the Sugarloaf and the supporting strongpoints had not been silence and counter-attacking Bavarian troops began to form up ready to take back losses.

18:30 - MacKenzie believes that men are in the Sugarloaf and the left flank has been successfully taken by 2/7 Warwicks. Keen to cut off the exposed flanks to these gains, he requests from Haking the deployment of reserve battalions, which is approved at Corps HQ
19:10 – Bombardment for 1 hour begins on German lines in front of Wick salient with a view to secure these flanks.
18:30 – 184TH Brigade to re-attack Sugarloaf – Brigadier General Carter unaware of situation and shortages of men – this is eventually postponed until 21:00
19:30 – Haking, believing that 61st Division have a foothold on the left of the Sugarloaf presses MacKenzie to support Australians to his left with a combined assault at 21:00.

Click for larger image

1 hour later the true picture on 61st Divisions front becomes apparent and Haking suspends operations for the night, planning attacks for the next morning.

21:00 – Australians on 15TH Brigade front unaware of cancelation order for assault, send 58TH Battalion from support to attack Sugarloaf. Unassisted 2 coys. are wiped out.
23:00 – Haking countermands cancellation order and wants Sugarloaf taken during the night but news of 58TH Battalions destruction reaches McCay who cancels any further assaults on his front of the night. 61ST Division would still prepare for an assault during the night, and only when Brigade commander complains does Haking agree to a postponement on all fronts.

Fromelles20th

20TH July 1916

The Germans had been steady deploying support and reserve battalions into the line to snuff out pockets of resistance and retake lost ground, this combined with the continuing artillery barrage (helped by inexperienced Australian gunners) provided a hellish backdrop for any Australian units in captured German positions.

20th July 19:00 onwards – 6TH German army provide additional battalions and support artillery to Aubers/Fromelles area to supplement 6TH Bavarian Division at Aubers.

01:00 – First heavy, organised counter attack goes in against 14TH Brigade but is repulsed with German losses

02:30 – Attention turns to 8TH Brigade front and German bombers begin driving up the Kastenweg communication trench, 45 minutes later a break out from Delangre Farm surrounds the Australian of 8TH Brigade on 3 sides. By 04:00 Germans have cleared the Kastenweg and many troops have to make a dash back to British lines to survive, many being hit in the dash.

03:00 – Another assault in the centre against 14TH Brigade is more successful and the two battalions (along with reinforcements from the 55TH Battalion) are split. Further attacks to pinch out these pockets are repulsed, but gradually defending forces are getting thinner and by

05:30 – another assault drives the 14TH Brigade back across NML to their starting trenches.

05:30 – All gains have been lost and the Germans now control their original firing line with vast quantities of men available.

Click for larger image

Corps HQ

05:00 – Haking meets with his divisional commanders and Munro (1ST Army) to discuss the next steps fully planning to assault again later that morning. News comes through of the overnight situation – 8TH Brigade is back in its starting positions and 14TH (at that time) requiring reinforcements. Munro orders any further plans to be cancelled and all troops to withdraw under a box barrage later that morning.

06:30 – Communication breakdown means orders for the withdrawal of 14TH Brigade do not reach Pope until now, meantime another sustained attack is underway from the Germans and it’s not until nearly 08:00 that the all battalions receive this order.

09:30 – Australian retreat completed; men forced to move without cover to retire due to blocked communication trenches adding to the causalities. Artillery continue defensive bombardment until midday focusing on rear areas to stop potential pinch counter offensive.

Click for larger image

Aftermath

FromellesAftermath

The battle had been a complete tactical and strategic failure for the British. No ground was gained and heavy causalities suffered and did not force the Germans to commit extra reserves to the area or impede movement of troops onto the Somme battlefield.

The attack had become common knowledge behind the British lines with talk of the coming offensive filling estaminets and the local towns. Prisoners captured by the Germans still had Haking’s battle orders limiting offensives to set objectives and no more – this confirmed the German view that the show was no more than a stunt and was a feint to stop drawn attention away from the battlefield 50 miles further south.

Former chief of staff General Henry Wilson would describe the affair as “Botch job” and Capt. Landon after the war as “reckless extravagance in expenditure of life”.

McCay would proceed to sack 14TH Brigade commander Pope after accusing him of drunkenness whilst being un-contactable for a period during the battle – he would be later reinstated.

McCay would lead the 5TH Division onto the Somme after a refit which lasted until Oct before they were fit to re-enter the line. The attack at Flers would cost almost 1000 causalities and would eventually lead to McCay not commanding a field division again.

When McCay attempted to take control of 3RD Austrialian Division (after the promotion of John Monash) William Birdwood, commanding ANZAC Corp: "I told him i didnt want it [3RD Div] ruined like he ruined the 5th". Australian hero and VC winner Albert Jacka refused to shake McCay’s hand post-war after his handling of the 5TH Division.

Haking would sack 185TH Brigade commander Carter, with “no confidence” in his leadership and "demonstrated daily ignorance of the war"

German assessment of the offensive would describe it as "operationally and tactically senseless" describing the Australians as "[having] virtually no military discipline"

British communication would describe the action as: "Yesterday evening... we carried .....important raids on a front of two miles in which Australian troops took part. About 140 German prisoners were captured" – this caused much resentment in the AIF and lead to a breakdown of trust between commanders within each force, it also seems to trivialise 11,000 causalities!

The 6TH BRIR would eventually move to the Somme and suffer very heavily in their tour of duty in October 1916.

Lt. General Haking

Prior to the outset of war Haking was a firm believer in the power of the offensive, publishing “Company Training” a strategy of offensive tactics and an advocate of repeated attacks would eventually succeed even against a stronger force.

He would describe the German defences at Loos as being like “[the] Crust of a pie – one thrust and it will be broken” he seems to advocate the same tactics for many campaigns, not seemingly learning from previous failures. He was certainly considered a thruster and equally keen on trench raids and harassment of the enemy.

Haking was also disliked by sub-ordinates, described by Lt. Col Game as a vindictive bully, he was seen as someone who was inflexible and appeared to have little care for the men he lead. He also ignored advice from Brigade commanders regarding the accuracy of artillery and when postponing the attack on the 17TH made mention to Munro that the artillery was “not fully trained” but still continued on.

His reputation with peer commanders was also far from ideal; General William Birdwood would not only raise reservations (“fools if they think it’s anything other than a diversion”) about Fromelles at GHQ prior to the offensive but this was ignored by Haking being “very confident of success” in his plans for Fromelles and any cancelation would “damage morale”.

He would also plan for continued attacks through the hours of the battle even when it became apparent that no breakthrough could be made and ultimately it was Munro who cancelled further actions and ordered a retreat.

One of the lasting legacies of Haking was his callous remarks when failure occurred; at Loos he would seemingly change his account of battle to match with Haig’s account in his struggle to remove then CIC John French. He would describe the offensive at the Boars Head a few weeks before Fromelles as doing “Much good” to the battalions after these had been wiped out again with no gain.

He would controversially mention in his dispatches for the Battle that the 61ST Division “[was] not sufficiently imbued with the offensive spirit to go in like one man at the appointed” and of the Australians, although gallant, “were not sufficiently trained to consolidate the ground gained”.

He would contradict his comments when postponing the battle on the 17TH by saying: “The artillery preparation was adequate” and “the wire was properly cut and the assaulting Battalions had a clear run into the enemy’s trenches” despite intelligence from the field stating otherwise. Most controversial he commented that “with two trained Divisions the position would have been a gift after the artillery bombardment” despite having three trained divisions in May 1915 after a weaker held liner and suffering a similar failure in a similar timeframe.

FromellesHaking

Reasons for Failure

Amongst the reasons for the failure at Fromelles include:

Inexperienced infantry divisions picked for the assault. Some battalions were experiencing their first time in the firing line during the battle.
Australian artillery was very green. Many men never having fired on the WF and without adequate training.
Haking’s plans were over ambitious in his original objectives and his assessment of the battlefield – he expected the artillery to have destroyed wire, emplacements and many German soldiers, in reality this was not the case and reports from scouting parties reported as much.
Lessons not learnt from the previous Aubers offensive, nor Loos. Haking still believed in the power of the offensive and even with adequate shells had suffered heavy losses at the Boers Head a few weeks previous but still firmly believed in his offensive strategies
Hurried preparation – brigade commanders only have a handful of days to prepare plans on ground they had no knowledge of. The Germans on the other hand had been in the same area for a year and were fully aware of the ground on which they would fight.
Under estimation of the enemy – for the previous year the Germans had been preparing the ground for defensive operations; deep concrete bunkers, belts of wire, mutually supporting strongpoints, machine gun emplacements, tactics designed for defence and counter-insurgency were all employed to great effect by the Germans
Lack of surprise – Fatigues carried out prior to the assault and a seven hour bombardment that was sure to let the Germans know that an attack would be immediate
Advance in broad daylight – artillery was unsuppressed prior to the off, M.G. firing into concentrated sally ports of soldiers, OP observing over the British lines and all this conducted in Summer daylight – made easy work for German gunners and M.G. teams cutting many battalions down across NML.
Poor communication and constant tactical adjustments – particularly with the deployment of the 59TH Australian battalion. The 2ND attack scheduled for 21:00 was called off but McCay HQ did not pass the message down to Brigade level meaning a 2 coys. of a battalion were needlessly wiped out. Haking also cancelling then un-cancelling orders (the 21 AM attack on the Sugarloaf) must have given lower level commanders, trying to get a picture of the battlefield, a near impossible job trying to understand what was required, coupled with trying to manage already depleted and scattered units.
Divisional Boundary on a strongpoint – Haking placed his divisional boundary on the strongpoint of the German line the Sugarloaf at NML widest point.
Impossible to hold objectives – many units particularly the 61ST Division were already suffering with shortages of men, any ground captured would have been difficult to hold without sufficient reserves (no divisional reserve option) particularly against aggressive counter attacks
Intelligence failures – many troops being causalities searching beyond the German fire line searching for none existent 2ND and 3RD lines before the German support trench. Outposts formed but troops are leaderless and scattered and no coherent line is formed.
Objectives overlooked – McCay wants troops to “push on” as far as possible rather than settling to limited battle objectives. No M.G. posts set up to consolidate captured positions and men wasted trying to push past their own artillery and becoming victim to short firing shells.
Feint obvious at an early stage – German initially expected a feint in some part of the line; this was quickly identified as not a genuine attempt for a breakthrough and captured prisoners found in possession of attack objectives which quickly confirmed the intention.

FromellesFailure