top of page

Battles

The War

The Battle of Cambrai

20th November to 7th  December 1917

Cambrai_Plan
Cambrai_Prelude

The Battle for Cambrai would be the last major offensive of 1917 on the Western Front (WF) beginning on the 20TH November and running until the 7TH December whilst actions in the area continued until 31ST December.

 

The action was a major undertaking for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to create a breakthrough within the newly created Siegfriend-Stellung (Hindenburg) defensive line the Germans had retreated to in Spring 1917.

 

The battle would be the first in which tanks would play a major supporting role in infantry assaults along with the extensive use of unregistered artillery (sound-ranging) by the British. Arras in early 1917 had started the integration of different armed forces working in unison with Cambrai being an extension of this – the initial British success would soon be halted and German counter assaults would lead to a stalemate, but important lessons are learnt by both sides and would act as a learning curve for the actions in 1918.

 

Prelude

 

The battle in Flanders around Ypres and Passchendaele had ground to an unsatisfactory stalemate for the British, fighting both the weather and a persistent enemy; Commander-in-Chief (CIC) Douglas Haig was keen for a final assault before the close down due to the onset of winter. He hoped a short, sharp shock offensive east of Bapaume would end the 1917 campaign with a morale-boosting British victory against the “impregnable” Hindenburg line.

 

The initial plan for an offensive had been proposed by the French CIC (at the time) Robert Nivelle during the April conference between allied armies on the WF. Nivelle proposed a joint Anglo-French offensive around St. Quentin with British planning beginning in May 1917. The initial plan was a non-infantry attack purposed by Brigadier General Tudor (artillery commander for 9TH Division) and Brigadier H.H. Tudor (Tank Corps) using artillery and tanks with a key feature the element of surprise by not pre-registering artillery before battle. These plans were shelved until September when freshly promoted General Byng took command of 3RD Army.

 

On the Italian Front a major breakthrough by the Austrian army at Caporetto in October 1917 forces the creation of an Italian Expeditionary Force (IEF) by the British consisting initial of two Divisions with another two assigned. This diverted resources away from the WF against Haig’s wishes and to relieve pressure on the Italian front combined with wishing to show the WF as the major theatre of operations convinces Haig that an offensive should be launched. He also hoped of diverting German troops arriving from the closed down Russian front away from entering the Italian battlefields.

 

The British begin moving large quantities of machinery and men into the Bapaume to Cambrai sector, 3 Brigades of tanks would be available along-side 4 Calvary divisions and eventually 19 infantry divisions. This movement was largely undetected by Crown Prince Rupprecht and the 3 German divisions holding the sector around Cambrai.

 

On the 15TH November Haig wrote that the offensive would be terminated if no major advantage was seen inside 48 hours, hoping to persuade Prime Minister Lloyd-George (very much anti-Haig and an “Eastern” – opposed to Haig who favoured concentration on the WF) that similar long-running attrition campaigns such as the Somme and 3RD Ypres would not be repeated.

 

Plan

 

Haig would put at the disposal of Byng almost a quarter of the entire British strength on the WF. Byng planned the offensive in 3 distinct stages:

 

  • Stage 1 –A crossing of the St. Quentin canal to the south of Cambrai which would then be exploited by cavalry in reserve to prevent re-supply and reinforcement

  • Stage 2 – An advance north-east on the highpoint of Bourlon and the surrounding woods south of Bourlon village

  • Stage 3 – Clear Cambrai village and encircle remaining troops trapped behind the cavalry advance further south

 

Byng would make use of the latest tank (Mark IV) to breach the Hindenburg line and assist infantry in crossing trenches and destroying strongpoints – he would also have Royal Flying Corps (RFC) assistance with aircraft available for bombing, strafing and sighting. He intended to leave the ground uncrated to assist tank movement, so paramount to the plan was the avoidance of a large artillery barrage prior to Z hour, this massive surveyance of German positions was achieved in conjunction with the RFC.

 

Byng would make use of 476 tanks for the offensive with 378 in a fighting role, approx. 50 in supply roles (petrol, oil, water etc.), 30 for wire removal with a further 12 allocated for communication and RE duties (bridging the St. Quentin canal).

 

Alongside these were over 300 aircraft which would perform pre-battle bombardments, recon for surveying required for non-registration of artillery, strafing and a critical role of providing distraction noise to allow the movement of tanks to starting positions at start of battle.

 

Tank commander Brigadier General Elle preferred to concentrate tanks using spearheading into German lines en-mass but was unable to persuade infantry commanders who wished to use tanks on a broad spread to protect assault troops. Not all Major Generals were convinced by tactics of using tanks and some divisions would follow their own interpretation of combined infantry/tank tactics.

 

Byng’s frontage would be 11,000 yards with assault day set for 20TH November with zero hour set at 06:20 (dawn). Byng’s headquarters would remain in Albert for the duration of the operation with III (Lt. General Pulteney) & IV Corp (Lt. General Woollcombe) alongside the Cavalry Corps (Lt. General Kavanagh) being the assaulting force. III Corp would be responsible for stage 1, crossing the canal and securing for the cavalry in reserve to exploit with IV Corp on the left executing stage 2 with all 3 Corps responsible for stage 3.

 

Divisions

 

56TH (London) Division – Major General Dudgeon

 

  • 167TH Brigade – Brigadier Freeth – 1/1 &1/3 London, 1/7 & 1/8 Midds

  • 168TH Brigade – Brigadier Loch – 1/4, 1/12 (Rangers), 1/13 (Kensington), 1/14 (London Scots) London

  • 169TH Brigade – Brigadier Coke – 1/2, 1/5 (Rifles), 1/9 (Q.V.R), 1/16 (Westminster) London

 

36TH (Ulster) Division – Major General O.S.W. Nugent

 

  • 107TH Brigade – Brigadier W.M. Withycombe – 8, 9, 10, 15 Royal Irish Rifles

  • 108TH Brigade – Brigadier Griffiths – 9/R. Irish Fus, 11, 12, 13 Royal Irish Rifles

  • 109TH Brigade – Brigadier Ricardo – 9, 10, 11 R. Inniskilling Fus, 14 R.I.R.

  • Pioneer – 16 Royal Irish Rifles

 

62ND (West Yorkshire) Division – Major General W.P. Braithwaite

 

  • 185TH Brigade – Brigadier Hampden – 2/5, 2/6, 2/7, 2/8 West Yorkshires

  • 186TH Brigade – Brigadier Bradford VC – 2/4, 2/5, 2/6, 2/7 Duke of Wellington’s

  • 187TH Brigade – Brigadier R. O’B Taylor – 2/4 & 2/5 KOYLI, 2/4 & 2/5 Yorks & Lancs

 

41ST (Highland) Division – Major General G.M. Harper

 

  • 152ND Brigade – Brigadier H.P. Burn – 1/6 Gordon, 1/6 Seaforth, 1/8 Arg & Suths, 1/5 Seaforth

  • 153RD Brigade – Brigadier A.T. Beckwith – 1/7 B.W., 1/5 Gordon, 1/6 B.W. 1/7 Gordon

  • 154TH Brigade – Brigadier K.G. Buchanan – 1/4 Gordon, 1/7 Arg Suth, 1/4 Seaforth, 1/9 Royal Scots

  • Pioneer – 1/8 Royal Scots

 

12TH (Eastern) Division – Major General A.B. Scott

 

  • 35TH Brigade – Brigadier B. Vincent – 7/Norfolk, 7 Suffolk, 9/Essex, 5/Berks

  • 36TH Brigade – Brigadier C.S. Owen – 8/Fusiliers, 9/Fusiliers, 7/Sussex, 11/Midds.

  • 37TH Brigade – Brigadier Incledon-Webbery – 6/Queens, 6/W.Kent, 7/E.Surrey, 6/E. Kent

  • Pioneer – 5/Northampton

 

20TH (Light) Division – Major General W. D. Smith

 

  • 59TH Brigade – H.H.G. Hyslop – 10/KRRC, 11/KRRC, 10/RB, 11/RB

  • 60TH Brigade – Brigadier F.J. Duncan – 6/Ox & Bucks, 12/KRRC, 6/Shropshire, 12/RB

  • 61ST Brigade – Brigadier W.E. Banbury – 7/DCLI, 7/SLI, 12/Kings, 7/KOYLI

  • Pioneer – 11/DLI – 56 Tanks for attack & 14 for supplies

 

29TH Division – Reserve - Major General Beauvoir de Lisle

 

  • 86TH Brigade – Brigadier Cheape – 2/Fusiliers, 1/Leinster, 16/Midds, 1/Guernsey

  • 87TH Brigade – Brigadier Lucas – 2/SWB, 1/KOSB, 1/Inniskilling, 1/Border

  • 88TH  Brigade – Brigadier Nelson – 4/Worcs, 1/Essex, 2/Hants, Newfoundland

  • Pioneer – 2/Mons – 14 tanks – to be followed by 5/Canadian Calvary Brigade – 2 R.E. coys for canal crossing

 

Later Divisions:

 

40TH Division – Major General J. Ponsonby

 

  • 119TH Brigade – Brigadier Crozier – 19/R.W.F, 12/S.W.B, 17/ & 18/ Welch Regiment

  • 120TH Brigade – Brigadier Hon. Willoughby – 14 Argylls, 14/H.L.I., 11 Kings, 13/E.Surrey

  • 121ST Brigade – Brigadier Campbell – 20 & 21/ Midds, 13/Green Howards, 12/Suffolks

  • Pioneer – 12/Green Howards

 

2ND Division – Major General Pereira

 

  • 5TH Brigade – Brigadier Bullen-Smith – 2/H.L.I, 17/& 24/ R.F., 2 Ox & Bucks

  • 6TH Brigade – Brigadier Walsh – 1/Liverpool, 17/Midds, 13/Essex, 2/S. Staffs

  • 99TH Brigade – Brigadier Kellett – 1/Berks, 1/K.R.R.C., 22/ & 23/ R.F.

 

Guards Division – Major General Feilding

 

  • 1ST Brigade – Brigadier Champion De Brooke – 2/ & 3/ Cold, 1/Irish, 2/Gren

  • 2ND Brigade – Brigadier Sergison Seymour – 1/Cold, 2/Irish, 3/Gren, 1/Scots

  • 3rd Brigade – Brigadier Lord Crespigny – 1/Welsh, 1/ & 4/ Gren, 2/Scots

  • Pioneer – 4/Coldstream

 

59TH (2ND Midland) Division – Major General C.F. Romer

 

  • 176TH Brigade – Brigadier Cope – 2/5 & 2/6 N. Staffs, 2/5 & 2/6 S. Staffs

  • 177TH Brigade – Brigadier Stansfield – 2/4 & 2/5 Lincolns, 2/4 & 2/5 Leics

  • 178TH Brigade – Brigadier James – 2/5, 2/6, 2/7, 2/8 Sherwood Foresters

 

47TH (2ND London) Division – Major General Gorringe

 

  • 140TH Brigade – Brigadier Kennedy – 1/6 (Rifles), 1/7, 1/8 (Post office), 1/15 (Civil Ser) London

  • 141ST Brigade – Brigadier Erskine – 1/17 (Stepney), 1/18 (Irish), 1/19 (St. Pancras) 1/20 (Blackheath & Woolwich) London

  • 142ND Brigade – Brigadier Bailey – 1/21 (Surrey), 1/22 (Queens), 1/23, 1/24 (Queens) London

  • Pioneer – 4 Welch Fusiliers

 

 

 

20TH November 1917

 

The day dawned cold, damp and misty at first light. The critical part of the day would call for the crossing of the St. Quentin canal by the cavalry and this was impressed onto the 20 & 29TH Divisions of Pulteney’s III Corp that a crossing should be made and the bridges secured as early as possible.

 

III Corps

 

6TH Division

 

6th Division were on the right flank of III Corps.  Its task was to sweep NE as far as Noyelles on the left bank of the river Escaut.  It would protect the left flank of 29th Div once it had taken the bridges lower down over the canal.  Its 71ST Brigade was given Ribecourt as an objective (it had tanks in support).  16 Brigade, also supported by tanks, would attack on the right at the same time as 71ST Brigade heading for Marcoing and Noyelles.  

 

20TH Division

 

In the centre 20TH Division committed 60TH Brigade to the left with 61ST on the right; 59TH being in reserve. The 60TH faced strong initial resistance, assisted by 12 tanks attacking over Welsh ridge; the 2nd wave with 6 tanks in able to get into the 2ND line but again facing quite strong harassment forcing the brigade to dig in.

 

The 61ST fared better, their objective the fortified village of La Vacquerie, despite crossing open ground and attacking up hill, the brigade secures it objectives. Small hold ups occur but tanks crush wire allowing infantry to advance and elements of the Brigade are established close to Pam Pam Farm.

 

59TH Brigade pass through and continue the assault towards the canal, assisted by tanks the Brigade capture a bridge crossing the canal. Tank F22 attempts a crossing but the structure collapses into the water along with the tank; elements of the Brigade cross via a wooden bridge but find Masnieres heavily defended and fall back. In the meantime, without a crossing tanks assigned to 20TH Division begin shelling German positions from the British side of the canal. By the evening the British have possession of 2 additional bridges captured by 11/Rifles.

 

12TH Division

 

On the extreme right of the attack facing Banteux, they would attack between La Vacquerie and Banteux north-eastwards along the Gonnelieu Ridge towards Sonnet Farm and Bleak House. They would assault uphill being overlooked by German positions on the ridge and further on from Bonavis Ridge.

36TH Brigade would be on the division’s left flank with 35TH on the right and 37TH in reserve who would be deployed effectively in the centre of the other two brigades.

 

The 36TH would face the quarry which held a number of machine gun (M.G.) positions, early morning fighting would see the brigade capture the southern side of La Vacquerie village along with Bleak house which had escaped much of the artillery’s attention. Pushing onwards further waves capture the farm buildings at Bonavis and Le Quennet farm before arriving at Lateau Wood. Elements of the Brigade cross the canal to find Bantouzelle unoccupied but eventually retire; digging in around Lateau Wood.

 

35TH Brigade attack towards Sonnet Farm breaking through and advancing towards Zucker Farm before digging in during the afternoon.

 

The reserve brigade, the 37TH, attack around 09:00 capturing Le Pave and assist in the fighting around Le Quennet farm and later in the morning with the 36TH around Lateau wood; later in the afternoon advance elements were relieved by battalions from the 36TH division. No meaningful crossing of the canal is made on the extreme right but objectives are achieved by the division in securing the right flank looking down towards the canal and the surrounding villages.

29TH Division (Reserve)

 

The division would pass through the 12TH & 20TH Division continuing the attack over the canal and establishing a foothold on the German side of the bank allowing secure crossing for the cavalry. They would attack between Marcoing and Masnieres after a 7 mile march to reach their off positions.

 

86TH Brigade in the division’s left with the Guernsey battalion getting into Nine wood on the extreme left and the 16/Middlesex securing the division’s northern (left) flank without meeting determined resistance.

 

87TH Brigade in the centre would attack the southern part of Marcoing and the canal salient and continue towards Noyelles. The brigade attack and generally progress well, clearing the village by midday and arriving at the canal salient. The cavalry follow up later that afternoon and join the brigade (dismounted) in and around the canal.

 

Advanced elements of the brigade cross the canal and continue towards Flot Farm but with exposed flanks, the Masnieres-Beaurevoir (MB) line is found still heavily wired and in danger of being cut-off withdraw awaiting supporting artillery and tanks. By dusk the brigade is dug in around Marcoing village on the British side of the canal.

 

On the right the 88TH Brigade would attack towards Masnieres – on the brigade’s left the advance is delayed by flanking fire from remaining strongpoint on Welsh ridge. In the centre, elements cross the canal but are under heavy fire crossing. Reserves and Fort Garry Horse take fire trying to cross canal and are unable to progress past Les Rues Vertes.

 

On the left progress made after strongpoint taken and Newfoundland cross canal and advanced towards Rumilly but MB line wire intact and dig in awaiting developments on right. On extreme right elements of the brigade enter Masnieres and advance  and meet up with elements of 20TH Division during dusk.

 

 

21ST November 1917

 

3RD army to continue advance with zero hour to be set by Corp commanders – 09:00 for IV Corps with III Corps 2 hours later. Haig would learn that initial success would mean that two divisions earmarked for Italy would be released to him.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

51ST Division

 

They would attack from Flesquieres between Fontaine and Cantaing villages with the 152ND to the north of 153RD Brigade, with 154TH in reserve.

 

The attack gets off at zero hour and the left makes good progress until the Brigades reach the Cantaing line which stops further advance with heavy MG fire obscured by the mist and rain. 154TH continue advance being stopped by wire and MG from Cantaing line. Around Midday, 6 tanks assist 154TH in breaking the line and capture the village – further advance is halted by fire from “The Mill” strongpoint. More tanks arrive and assist with the clearance of Anneux village but casualties from artillery high and village not completely cleared until 15:00. The attack is halted due to lack of reserves but Cambrai appears lightly defended and Rupprecht would later be surprised by failure to continue assault.

 

Small arms ammo (SAA) is running low and advance parties of 154TH relieved by 153RD overnight with the division holding the line from Anneux to in front of Cantaing. Remnants of a battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders were inside Fontaine village surrounded on three sides by the Germans.

 

29TH Division

 

Before zero hour a German counter attack towards Noyelles is repulsed by artillery and flank fire; this continues past zero hour and 86TH Brigade is driven from the village but halts further advance with reinforcements of unmounted cavalry on division’s left flank.

 

On the right the 87TH Brigade with 30 tanks would advance towards the MB line and take Flot Farm; advance delayed by an hour due to only having a single bridge-head with both tanks and infantry delayed crossing. The MB line’s uncut wire held up advance and the tanks did little wire cutting being harassed by artillery fire. The brigade withdrew across the canal and by dusk is back in its start line.

 

The 88TH Brigade was too exhausted to advance and consolidated its position in front of Masnieres.

 

Late afternoon, tanks arrive to assist 86TH and unmounted cavalry retake Noyelles village and the division could be relieved overnight by the 6TH, having made no progress.

 

20TH Division

 

Early morning attack by 10/Rifles to secure canal crossing at Les Rues Des Vignes fails, main attack goes in at 11:00 with assistance of tanks. By 13:00 no tanks arrive and 59TH Brigade advance towards Crevecoeur but heavy MG fire from MB line slows progress. 1 coy of 11/KRRC cross canal.

 

By 15:00 4 tanks arrive but only 1 canal crossing exists and tank commanders are sceptical if this could take the weight, so no crossing attempt and remaining British forces across canal retreat back to start lines.

 

By the end of the 21ST November CIC orders Byng to concentrate on the capture of Bourlon and the high ground. Byng would close operations on III Corps’ front on the southern sector concentrating efforts with IV Corps from 22ND November onwards. The southern sector would be turning into a defensive flank with limited, local operations to try and achieve better positions in the coming days, but largely III Corps would be on a defensive footing.

 

Divisions are not relieved and no further reinforcements are committed to cover losses in battalions, in contrast the Germans were reinforcing with divisions arriving into Cambrai overnight and 4 additional divisions promised; Rupprecht expects further attacks and plans to wear down the British prior to having the strength to conduct a counter offensive.

 

 

22ND November 1917

 

The morning dawned misty, with a biting wind turning to rain during the afternoon, Byng would close down the offensive in the south and concentrate his efforts in Bourlon with IV Corp. 1/5 Seaforth of 41ST Division held an exposed position in the centre of the battlefield at Fontaine surrounded in a salient.

 

On the far left of IV Corps’ front, 56TH Division is able to capture Tadpole Copse and hold against a fierce counter assault, whilst the 36TH enter Moeuvres in the morning and continue into the Hindenburg  line; by afternoon repeated counter attacks had driven the 36TH out of the village and by nightfall, they were back in their start positions.

 

41ST Division with advance positions in Fontaine village would come under German shelling from first light until around 09:00 when German counter attack commences; distress flares from 153RD Brigade not seen by artillery observers due to misty conditions and Germans enter the village. By afternoon, after fierce hand-to-hand fighting elements retire from the village, out of SAA with stragglers retiring after dark.

 

62ND Division would also face counter assaults in front of Anneux with shelling starting later supported by aircraft. The main assault began at 09:00 forcing the 185TH Brigade back over the Cambrai – Bapaume road. 187TH Brigade support their comrades and the advance is stopped at midday.

 

The only successful British operation would be capturing Tadpole Copse, already shattered battalions suffered further from local counter attacks. Rupprecht was still not in a position to launch an all-out counter assault, but approved local attacks; he also assumed correctly that the main British thrust would be towards Bourlon.

Artillery began moving from IV Corp front but terrain made movement difficult and 40TH Division would relieve 62ND at Graincourt after a long march from Bapaume. Re-supply of men difficult due to weather, congestion, terrain and movement of tanks.

 

During the morning CIC visited the battlefield and informed Byng that any delay in capturing Bourlon would be “unsatisfactory”.

 

 

23RD November 1917

 

The attack would concentrate on capturing Bourlon and the woods whilst providing a protective flank from the west, the attack front would be approximately 10,000 yards.

 

On the extreme left 56TH Division from Tadpole Copse would attack towards Inchy, on their right the 36TH would cross the Canal Di Nord and continue to Sains-les-Marquion, next to them the 40TH (replacing the 62ND) would capture the woods and continue into Bourlon village with the 51ST recapturing Fontaine village and the eastern edge of the wood. Zero hour was set for 10:30 with artillery barrage beginning 20 minutes before.

 

56TH Division advanced as fair as the Waton line but is held-up and dig in outside Inchy village.

 

36TH Division was able to break through the Waton line with 107TH Brigade assisted by 12 tanks; 108TH Brigade captured Moeuvres village in the morning. Consistent counter assaults force 108TH from the village in the afternoon with exposed flank on their left, where 56TH Division should have been.

 

The main focus of the assault would be 40TH Division in the centre supported by 29 tanks. The division was fresh to the battlefield and neither knew the terrain or had trained with tanks and had endured a heavy march the following night in wintery conditions. The division is harassed by artillery forming up for the morning assault and would attack over open ground.

 

121ST Brigade on the left with 119TH on their right; by mid-morning the assault appears to be operating well – 119TH had made it into the woods with comparatively light losses and 121ST made the outskirts of the village and with 7 tanks began making their way through, but are halted by artillery and MG fire from housing.

 

During early afternoon German counter attacks had removed the 121ST from the village only to be regained with tank assistance and further assaults are only repelled with assistance from 119TH reserve battalion. Shattered elements of 121ST Brigade hold a line on the northern edge of the village with 119TH having advanced into the eastern edge. The 121ST Brigade would be supplemented overnight with the 13/E. Surrey battalion.

 

51ST Division would attack from Cantaing NE towards Fontaine assisted by 24 tanks and advance towards Fontaine but are stopped by heavy MG fire which the female tanks are unable to suppress. Elements of 1/5 Seaforths enter the village but by midday German counter assaults have removed them and division digs in around the edge of Bourlon Wood and Fontaine. The division has at its disposal the cavalry division but are unable to utilise and it would be assigned to 40TH Division from 24TH onwards.

 

Misleading information passed back to Corp HQ that Bourlon and Fontaine villages were both in British hands, whereas only thinly held lines existed around Bourlon and 51ST division had not taken Fontaine but were dug in in front of village. Bourlon Wood would mostly be in British hands but that was the only real success and the British only held a tentative hold on Bourlon village.

 

 

24TH November 1917

 

The two divisions originally diverted to the Italian front arrive in Bapaume and are marched to the Cambrai area during a day of heavy rain and driving winds. The Guards division would also enter the battle for the first time with a Brigade taking up a section of the line from 40TH Division. The Germans continue to flood the area with reinforcements but Rupprecht continues to play the waiting game expecting further British assaults continuing the wearing down process.

 

56TH Division consolidates around Tadpole Copse but counter attacks drive forward elements out of the Hindenburg support line and the division is heavily engaged all day.

 

To its south the 36TH held its position around the Canal Du Nord at Lock 5 and would assist with support on the extreme left for 40TH Division assault on the village, the division is not involved in offensive action and spends much time consolidating its position.

 

The main battle again would be around Bourlon with 40TH Division and 12 tanks with an artillery bombardment of 1 hour to proceed an assault at 15:00. In the morning 119TH Brigade would repulse a German raid, and assault waves begin moving forward at midday but are spotted and shelled whilst conducting this movement. At zero hour the attack enters the village with varying resistance, a HE & gas barrage force a withdrawal and it’s not until 15:30 that tanks arrive in the east of the village but these are repulsed and 8 are lost.

 

Continued counter attacks continue until dusk and 121ST withdraw leaving the 14/HLI isolated in the village; reports of light losses at HQ and 120TH Brigade in support is assigned to 121ST command. During the evening 2/Scots Guards capture the highest part of Bourlon Wood and the British (except the 14/HLI) are in control of the woods but the village still remains in German hands.

 

Byng would plan to resume the assault with 40TH Division assisted by the Cavalry Division and tanks in capturing the village and joining with 14/HLI; Haig issues special order congratulating commanders on the successful capture of Bourlon – “a most successful operation” despite this being very much from the truth, showing how communication was so wanton through the war.

 

 

25TH November 1917

 

In contrast to the previous 5 days, the 25TH was calm and bright after a stormy night; focus would fall upon the capture of the village and linking up with 14/HLI around the train station in Bourlon village.

 

On the extreme flank of IV Corp 56TH Division would attempt one final time to recapture parts of the Hindenburg support line which is initially successful but counter-attacks force them back.

 

The worn-out 40TH Division would have another attempt to capture Bourlon village with the assistance of 12 tanks, however no tanks would be available for the assault due to refitting. During the night the 13/ E. Surreys arrive but are gassed during the process of forming up to attack due to commence at 06:15; the attack commences and is successful in linking up with the HLI, who are informed to prepare secure the remainder of village at 09:00. However, heavy German assaults are experienced by both battalions and numbers are quickly dwindling; by late morning the Germans start pushing elements back but the Surreys make contact with 119TH Brigade on their right, but lose contact with HLI who again are isolated.

 

Counter assaults would be beaten-off by the Surreys and the 119TH during the afternoon and elements of the Guards Division (GD) in their position at the eastern edge of Bourlon Wood (line stretches to Cantaing) these cease around dusk and the 40TH Division would be relieved by the 62ND who themselves had suffered heavily during the opening days. During the evening Byng would impress on Woollcombe that Bourlon and Fontaine must be captured “no later than the 27TH”.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

27TH November 1917

 

Winter continues with snow turning to ice making movement and resupply difficult with troops fighting the weather alongside the shells. Byng’s assault is scheduled for 06:20 without any prior bombardment, this would be Byng’s final attempt to capture Bourlon and Fontaine.

 

62ND Division would assault from in front of the woods towards the village with 187TH on the left of 186TH Brigade and a creeping barrage in front of infantry beginning at 06:20. 19 tanks available to assist in the hope of relieving 14/HLI in Bourlon. 77mm field artillery and MG fire inflict casualties. 187TH get into the village but no sign of HLI whilst 186TH veer left and are eventually forced to withdraw from the village closely followed by 187TH back to start positions.

 

The GD move up from 03:00 and some battalions suffer from artillery fire, at zero hour the 12 promised tanks have not arrived but the attack goes forward. The assault wave has mixed fortunes with 1/Coldstream only managing to get into Fontaine village but are isolated; right hand advance not possible due to fire from La Folie Wood.

 

Reinforcements sent to assist 1/Coldstream in village with tank support; elements get in to assist but other coys unable too; 3 out of 8 tanks lost. German counter attack eventually forces withdrawal from village and the advance is back in its start positions before midday. Reserves are deployed to stabilise line against counter offensives.

 

By 16:00 Byng is aware of the failures of both divisions and calls the cessation to the offensive; tanks will be withdrawn to Bapaume and the two divisions assaulting on the 27TH would be relieved (62ND by 47TH and Guards by 59TH). The Germans are still receiving divisions but do not yet have sufficient artillery and shells to begin their mass counter offensive.

 

 

28TH November 1917

 

The offensive had been ceased with three fresh divisions now deployed around Bourlon, GHQ’s expectation would be small scale offensive around Bourlon from the Germans but intelligence suggests no major counter offensive as the Germans were exhausted after the 1917 campaign.

 

Divisions around Bourlon and Fontaine begin wiring and improving trench systems, the Germans began gas shelling around Bourlon Wood using phosgene but not mustard gas; experienced soldiers became weary with mustard gas being an area denial weapon. VII Corps to the south report increased troops movements to Byng who is not duly concerned, promising its Lt. General D’Oyly Snow the Guards division as reinforcement, later giving this to Pulteney.

 

 

29TH November 1917

 

The weather had become milder and again another day of relative calm with wiring and trench preparation taking place, the RFC now largely occupied a reconnaissance role reported a build-up of supplies and troops behind German lines confirming D’Oyly-Snow’s reports but Byng again seems confident 3RD army would withstand German counter assaults. Brigadier Elles and tanks began their departure to the Somme with Haig assuming the Germans would assault the following spring but made preparations for a withdrawal to a more advantageous winter line (WL).

 

On the opposite side, Rupprecht was putting into place his final pieces and the last divisions arrived today; 3 army groups would be at his disposal having Gruppe Arras in the north commanded by Von Mouser with 5 divisions – in the centre 5 divisions made up Gruppe Caudry with Lt. General Watter and the southern sector commanded by von Kathen was Gruppe Busigny made up of 7 divisions.

 

The attack would begin on the 30TH at 07:00 with the overall goal of capturing Metz, the attack would come in two distinct waves; the first against the southern sector pushing northwards followed by a massive northern assault encircling and wiping out 3RD army.

 

 

 

Cambrai_Divisions
Cambrai_November1917

62ND Division

 

Division would attack towards Anneux from Graincourt and would be assisted by 20 tanks. By zero hour none had arrived so the attack delayed until 10:00 and commenced by 186TH Brigade getting through the village before being held up at the Waton Line. 185TH Brigade attacks towards Zucker farm but both brigades are held-up by artillery from Bourlon Wood, with 3 tanks finally moving forward after midday and entering the wood. 186TH Brigade enter the southern sector of the wood behind these tanks but no firm hold established and dig in in front of the wood. 186TH are relieved overnight by 185TH.

Cambrai, Battle, Map, 1917, WW1 Remembrance
Cambrai, Map, WW1 Remembrance
Cambrai, Royall Inniskilling Fusiliers, WW1 Remembrance

26TH November 1917

 

The break in the weather was no more as the cold wind returned with snow, the only positive for the infantry was no assaults would be attempted this day. The artillery would be used to weaken German positions prior to an assault on the 27TH. The only caveat was that Bourlon village not be targeted due to suspected presence of parts of 121ST Brigade.

 

In front of 56TH and 36TH Divisions the Quarry wood and Inchy were targeted but Fontaine is largely untouched in front of the GD. Late morning a conference with CIC, Byng, Woollcombe, Guards (Major General Feilding) and 62ND Division commander took place; with these two divisions to assault on the 27TH.

 

Feilding outlines his oppositions but is overruled by Byng; Haig orders no more reserves to be committed so how any gains would be held after the assault on the 27TH seems unclear. 36TH Division is relieved by the 2ND Division (intended for Italy) overnight.

 

Rupprecht is also planning with General Von Moser who has seven divisions in his northern sector, planning the first major German assault against the British since 1915.

Tank, Cambrai, WW1 Remembrance

30TH November 1917

 

Throughout the night Germans bombarded Bourlon wood with HE & gas shells which hung amongst the tree stumps. At 06:00 a hurricane bombardment began along the southern sector of the line in front of Banteux quickly growing in intensity towards zero hour, this added to the morning mist.

III Corps

 

29TH Division was holding the line between Marcoing and Masnieres with 87TH Brigade in Marcoing and 86TH in Masnieres and 88TH in reserve; by mid-morning the Germans had forced a retreat from Masnieres and had broken through in the South with battalions withdrawing across the canal. Further south Major General De Lisle HQ is almost over run at Gouzeaucourt from Germans advancing on the 55TH Division. 88TH Brigade is ordered up to form a defensive flank on the left of 87TH meanwhile the 86TH had withdrawn to Les Rues Vertes. Further advances are beaten back.

 

20TH Division had 61ST Brigade slightly south of Masnieres and 59TH Brigade on its right, south of the Bonavis Ridge just north of Lateau wood. The Germans forced their way through almost immediately after zero hour on the left, only being stopped at the Welsh ridge by the division’s pioneer battalion. On the right the Brigade was quickly thrown back to the old Hindenburg front line but advances slowed against the Bonavis ridge with artillery aiding the defenders. 

 

60TH Brigade having just been relieved by the 59TH and with the Brigadiers of 59TH & 60TH having just swapped and by mid-morning had sent two battalions to assist 12TH Division. By afternoon, the remaining battalions attempted counter assaults against Gonnelieu with partial success, this was attempted again overnight with similar results; small trench gains but Gonnelieu remained in German hands.

 

To the south was 12TH Division between Lateau Wood through Pelican Trench to Quarry Post with 37TH, 36TH and 35TH Brigades in the line in that order. On the left 37TH had lost Pam Pam Farm and was conducting a fighting retreat and by late morning Lateau Wood was in German hands.  36TH Brigade in the centre suffered a similar fate Bleak House and La Pave fell and aside from heroic acts with Brigade fell back with heavy losses. Around Quarry Post the 35TH retreated towards Gonnelieu village but this had fallen by 08:00 and the Brigade pushed back to Gouzeaucourt. With the help of 2 battalions from 20TH Brigade and the division pioneers they are able to stem the advance but Germans get into Gouzeaucourt. Between 36TH and 35TH Brigade the Germans by afternoon had forced the division back to the old German lines around La Vacquerie but an late afternoon assault by the Guards division reclaims German held parts of Gouzeaucourt, with the divisional line now stretching from behind Bleak House in front on La Vacquerie and onto Gouzeaucourt.

 

55TH Division in contact with VII Corps held the southern sector of III Corps line with 165TH and 166TH holding the line West of Banteux to NE of Lempire. At 07:00 Gruppe Busigny attacked heading NE. Both brigades are overrun and pushed back towards 12TH Division’s boundary and at 08:00 Germans have possession of Villers Guislain and the Division falls back towards the Quentin Ridge with a serious breach of the British line seems imminent, but the situation is stabilised by afternoon.

 

 

IV Corps

 

After gains in the south and centre by Gruppe Busigny and Caudry, it was now the turn of Gruppe Arras in the north to assault IV Corp. The morning began quietly although shelling gained intensity towards 09:00 when infantry assaults begin.

 

Between Moeuvres and the east of Bourlon Wood was 2ND Division who are assaulted by multiple waves of enemy troops with the 6TH Brigade around Lock 5 on the left of 99TH Brigade these would be assisted by their own and 36TH Division’s artillery. The 6TH brigade drive off many assaults but by mid-morning have been driven from Lock 5 and 99TH withdraw after heavy fighting in the old Hindenburg support trenches. In the afternoon 2ND Division supply reinforcements to 47TH Division with 2 battalions from reserve brigade. The division continues fighting a valiant withdrawal but by dusk has a hole punched in its left flank which is eventually halted with artillery support. Elements of the 13/Essex are left around Lock 5 detached from the rest of 6TH Brigade.

 

In front on Bourlon Woods facing the village was the 47TH Division with 140TH  Brigade on the left of 141ST with 142ND in reserve, again 36TH Division would assist the division’s artillery in cutting down assault waves but these continue for most of the morning until a breach on the extreme left begins working around the division’s flank. This gap along with further frontal assaults force the division from the high ground of Bourlon Ridge and despite counter assaults this would remain in German hands. Attacks continue into the evening with very heavy enemy losses but by night the shattered brigades are handed respite as attacks die away.

 

To the right of the 47TH are the 59TH situated between the west of Bourlon Wood and Cantaing facing Fontaine. Only one Brigade, 176TH is holding the line, with 178TH in reserve and 177TH assigned to RE duties! 176TH is able to hold this front despite repeated attacks with MG fire taking a heavy toll. By midday 177TH is able to send 2 battalions to assist 6TH Division of III Corps on the division’s right flank and also the artillery began a withdrawal towards the WL being prepared by 177TH. Despite heavy losses that required 176TH to be withdrawn the line held.

Rupprecht’s plan appeared to be stalling – the initial southern assault had provided early success (particularly against 55TH Division) but as the day wore on and the British consolidated and German losses mounted any hope of a breakthrough had been lost. The line had been punctured in various places but fighting withdrawals and supporting artillery had limited German advances and the British still maintained a defensive line, all-but with heavy losses in some sectors.

The northern assault from Von Moser’s Arras Group had failed to achieve the expected envelopment and had made little headway into the British lines and this group would feel the pinch most in terms of losses.

 

 

1ST December 1917

 

Rupprecht was informed by Von Moser that his troops were too depleted to form any scalable assault on IV Corp and was only able to launch local attacks against Woollcombe’s divisions.

 

The 6TH Brigade of 2ND Division beats off concentrated assault around Moeuvres at the point of the bayonet after the Germans had breached their trenches and the 99TH defeated an assault on Canal Trench; both side’s artillery would duel throughout the day.

 

On III Corps front the two German army groups had suffered less than their northern colleagues and this front was slightly more active.

 

The Guards and the dismounted 5TH Cavalry Divisions would launch a counter assault to recapture Gonnelieu and Villers Guislain lost the previous day by the 55TH. At 06:30 the assault was launched and although the Guards were able to capture Gauche Wood the cavalry were not as successful against Villers Guislain. Further assaults by the Guards against Gonnelieu are destroyed as the Germans are planning their own offensive and the village is flooded with troops.

 

29TH Division would also attempt to recapture Les Rues Vertes but this is halted; further assaults would be attempted throughout the day but all would fail and the 86TH Brigade would be withdrawn leaving the Germans in control of Masnieres Les Rues Vertes and remainder of 29TH around Marcoing.

 

At 10:00 the Germans in Gonnelieu pour forward towards La Vacquerie against 20TH Division, they immediately capture Sonnet Farm and get into La Vacquerie but elements of the Guards are assigned and the SE edge of the village is cleared.

 

III Corps would be relieved by V Corps which had been postponed by 24 hours the previous evening. 61ST Division is brought up to relieve 12 & 20TH with the 29TH relieved by 182ND Brigade. Rupprecht is made aware of the further failure in the north and the realisation dawned that his objectives would not be achievable before winter.

 

 

2ND December 1917

 

Both sides were exhausted by the past two weeks and the Germans were reorganising their lines and resupply. The Germans attempted a local assault around Marcoing but this was easily repulsed in the morning by battalions of 29TH Division.

 

V Corps artillery takes control of the northern sector and begins bombardment of the German lines before launching an evening attack against Lock 5 of the Canal Du Nord which fails and even results in German gains into British lines which had to be counter attacked – no ground gained by either side. At night 47TH Division assaults Bourlon Ridge and captured the high ground lost the previous day.

 

At the close of the day Haig informed Byng of his intention to withdraw to the WL still in preparation, maybe realising the scale of resources available to Rupprecht. It appears Haig would sacrifice hard fought ground to stop further losses to 3RD Army.

 

 

3RD December 1917

 

At 11:00 51ST Division holding the line around Moeuvres drive off an attempted attack around Tadpole Copse with the assistance of 99TH Brigade of 2ND Division. The stage would now be set for Brigades to begin their phased withdrawal towards the WL, not before 29TH Division is assaulted with the Germans trying to force a way through between Marcoing and Noyelles further north.

 

During the evening all units across the Canal of III Corps are brought back to the British side and bridges blown by RE, this would coincide with the general retirement to the WL.

 

 

4TH December 1917

 

Retreat to the WL continues; the only real scare occurs when the 47TH Division withdrawing through Bourlon Wood towards Anneux is nearly cut off by a German advance from the east but is able to hold its right flank and withdraw successfully.

 

 

6TH December 1917

 

The first large scale assault since the 2ND December comes from Bourlon Wood against the 59TH Division towards Anneux and Graincourt, this is beaten out with artillery assistance and the retreat to the WL continues. 29TH Division defeat German assault around La Vacquerie and are relieved by the 63RD Division (RNR) – all movements to the WL completed by the morning of the 7TH December.

 

 

30TH & 31ST December

 

German large scale assault against Welsh Ridge using 14 Battalions (attacking in arctic suits) in freezing, snowy winter conditions would be repulsed by the 63RD RNR Division but with heavy losses for the RNR with 1,500 casualties. This would be called the Action on Welsh Ridge.

 

 

Post Battle Analysis

 

  • British under-estimate German power of recovery and ability to deploy reserves into the area

  • 10,000 yards advance on a front of 11,000 miles after first day – church bells ring in Britain

  • Fixed lines of defences can be broken and are vulnerable even

  • Fatigue brings British attack to a halt along with durable and capable German defences after 9 days of battle

  • Infantry should be lightly equipped to reduce fatigue

  • Impetus lost when IV Corps attack (northern) waits for 62ND Division awaits 51ST Division to keep-in-line before advancing

  • British under-estimate German power of recovery and ability to deploy reserves into the area

  • British hold large sector of “invincible” defences after 27TH November when Haig calls a halt and some 50% of salient still held by British after 

  • British had broken through impenetrable and made the war “mobile” even briefly German attacks and close down on 7TH December

  • HQ at all levels needs to be closer to front for orders and information to be received

  • First real combined assault using Tank, Infantry, Calvary, Artillery (without pre-registration) and Aircraft

  • Commanders too far away to instruct deployment of reserves (41ST Division breaking through at Anneux but not continuing to Cambrai) – Byng too distant at Albert

  • GHQ expected German counter attacks from Bourlon but intelligence suggest after Flanders and Cambrai German were exhausted – this was not the case

  • British would commit approximately ¼ of their WF front to Cambrai after punishing battle in Flanders

  • German divisions from the EF destined for Italy are diverted to Cambrai

  •  British official reason for battle failure for lack of training and perseverance

  • Haig originally committed to 48 hour offensive, but was sucked into a longer campaign because of initial success – subsequently operation after first assault becoming increasingly costly

  • British first success with unregistered/range finding artillery in major action

  • Tank had proven its worth in assisting infantry with capturing static trench systems but was still vulnerable in confined locations i.e. street fighting and wooded areas

  • Closer co-operation between all parts of armed services

  • No availability of smoke for assaults over open ground led to losses when M.G. or flanks not supressed

  •  Haig decision to begin withdrawal to winter line fundamentally sound after closing down offensive

  • Battlefield command rather confused particularly with availability, deployment and arrival of tanks

  • Rupprecht had suffered similar under-estimation of British strength and difficultly of attack as British had initially

  • Germans begin to perfect defence against tank assault – detaching infantry from tanks make both more vulnerable

  • Rupprecht continues to push waves of assault against strongly fortified British positions after initial failure, particularly on IV (later V) Corp front

  • Braithwaite and Harper both sceptical of tank assaults and prefer different tactics

  •  Feilding reservations about Guards Division assault largely ignored by Byng and Haig despite knowledge of attack front and conditional of his troops

·         

 

Cambrai_December1917
Cambrai_PostBattleAnalysis
bottom of page